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Debar v. Women and Infants Hospital11/29/2000
tion made here by the defendants that a medical professional must possess the same formal certifications as a defendant to give expert opinion in a medical malpractice case. See, e.g., Pool v. Bell, 551 A.2d 1254, 1258 (Conn. 1989); Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 887, 892 (Conn. 1975); Letch v. Daniels, 514 N.E.2d 675, 677 (Mass. 1987). In Pool, 551 A.2d at 1258, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a neurologist could testify and proffer an expert opinion on the duty of care required of a general surgeon in a medical malpractice action. In Fitzmaurice, 356 A.2d at 892, the Supreme Court of Connecticut also ruled that it was error for the trial court to exclude the proffered expert testimony of a surgeon specializing in breast cancer surgery about the standard of care for an obstetrician and gynecologist in diagnosing breast cancer. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Letch, 514 N.E.2d at 677, also held that an orthodontist could testify and proffer an opinion in a medical malpractice case involving a pedodontist. Accordingly, we have construed the wording of ยง 9-19-41 and Rule 702 both literally and liberally as intending to require only that the proffered expert possess adequate knowledge, skill, experience, or education in the same field as the alleged malpractice. See Flanagan, 712 A.2d at 369; Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 165. In defining what constitutes the "field" of alleged malpractice, this Court has looked largely to the nature of the patient's injury or to the nature of the procedure employed rather than to rigid classifications based solely on specialty certification. In Sheeley, we explained: "The appropriate standard of care to be utilized in any given procedure should not be compartmentalized by a physician's area of professional specialization or certification. On the contrary, we believe the focus in any medical malpractice case should be the procedure performed and the question of whether it was executed in conformity with the recognized standard of care, the primary concern being whether the treatment was administered in a reasonable manner. Any doctor with knowledge of or familiarity with the procedure, acquired through experience, observation, association, or education, is competent to testify concerning the requisite standard of care and whether the care in any given case deviated from that standard." Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 166.
Accordingly, this Court has consistently held that an expert's testimony on the appropriate standard of care must be admitted when the witness possesses prerequisite prior experience in the field of the alleged malpractice, regardless of his or her formal specialty or certifications. See, e.g., Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 166; Buja, 688 A.2d at 819. We have reasoned that an expert's lack of formal certification may go to the weight to be given the expert's opinion by the fact finder rather than to its admissibility and a trial justice should not bar such testimony ab initio. See Buja, 688 A.2d at 819 (citing Marshall, 677 A.2d at 426-27).
In so doing we of course continue to require that any proffered expert witness must still first demonstrate to the trial justice his or her particular knowledge acquired through education or experience in the field of alleged malpractice. See, e.g., Buja, 688 A.2d at 819. As we noted in Marshall, 677 A.2d at 427, this Court requires that the "proponent of [expert testimony] must still show the trial court that the so-called expert-witness has knowledge, skill, training, or experience in the same field as the alleged malpractice so that the expert's testimony can be genuinely helpful to the jury." We believe, as aptly noted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Fitzmaurice, 356 A.2d at 892, that: "Recognizing the complexi
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