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Debar v. Women and Infants Hospital11/29/2000
illful interpretation of obstetrical data and only could speculate on matters related to causation. In doing so, he obviously overlooked Dr. Adler's particular and considerable experience in interpreting obstetrical data, including fetal heart monitoring strips and pH levels. In this case, the question of causation revolved around when meconium aspiration syndrome occurred and, consequently, the approximate time when it became necessary for the defendants to perform a cesarean section. Depending upon his or her training and experience, a board-certified pediatric neurologist might be more qualified than the average pediatrician or perhaps even the average obstetrician to answer questions of causation. A pediatric neurologist by definition deals with injuries to the central nervous system, including the brain, many of which result from oxygen deprivation. As Dr. Adler testified, many of his patients consisted of newborns with injuries resulting from birth asphyxia. That hands-on experience, when coupled with the doctor's qualifications as a board-certified pediatrician and especially as a board-certified pediatric neurologist, we conclude, would qualify him to testify about the cause of the infant's death in this case. We determine that the trial justice clearly abused his discretion and erred in refusing to permit Dr. Adler to proffer his expert opinion about what caused the death of infant Debar. We determine that error to have been so prejudicial to the plaintiffs' case as to constitute reversible error and to require a new trial.
III. Other Allegations of Error
Because we have concluded that the trial justice in this case erred, and that such error constituted reversible error necessitating a new trial, we need not address the plaintiffs' remaining appellate issues, except to allude briefly to the plaintiffs' contention regarding the denial of their motion for a trial continuance.
When, as in this case, the exclusion of expert testimony by a trial justice leaves a party fatally vulnerable to a defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the endangered party might reasonably be allowed a short continuance to engage another expert witness, or the trial justice should consider whether to treat a defendant's Rule 50 motion as a motion for an involuntary non-suit pursuant to Rule 50(3).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the plaintiffs' appeal and vacate the judgment of the Superior Court. The papers of this case are remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.
Justice Flanders did not participate.
Appeal from County: SOURCE OF APPEAL: Superior Providence JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: Needham, J.
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