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Hawes v. Chua3/29/2001
surance in any civil case is so high that, unless really necessary, it's going to outweigh the probative value." Appellants' counsel proffered no specific facts showing that because Dr. Hill had the same insurance carrier as Doctors Chua and Kleiman, that he would suffer adverse financial consequences if the jury rendered a verdict against them. Nonetheless, appellants ask us to rely on Davis v. Immediate Med. Servs., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1997), and to hold that a trial judge must allow cross-examination as to commonality of insurance coverage between a defense expert witness and a defendant in a medical malpractice case. We decline to do so in this case.
Ohio apparently is the only jurisdiction to adopt a per se rule concerning commonality of insurance evidence. See Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422, 425 n.2 (Colo. 2000). In contrast to Ohio, the majority of jurisdictions follow the "substantial connection" analysis:
The substantial connection analysis looks to whether a witness has "a sufficient degree of 'connection' with the liability insurance carrier to justify allowing proof of this relationship as a means of attacking the credibility of the witness." Otwell v. Bryant, 497 So.2d 111, 115 (Ala. 1986). These courts have rejected a mere "commonality of insurance" approach, holding that the likelihood of bias is so attenuated that the risk of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to allow evidence that an expert witness was insured by the same insurance carrier as the defendant when this was the only connection between the witness and the insurance carrier. See id. at 113-114. However, in another case that court allowed evidence that an expert witness was a member of the board of directors and was employed by the same liability insurer as the defendant. See Hinton & Sons v. Strahan, 96 So.2d 426, 431-32 (Ala. 1957). Id. at 425.
Bonser also references and discusses other cases that apply the "substantial connection" analysis. See id. at 425-26. In the case before us, given the trial court's broad discretion in admitting evidence, see Knight v. Georgetown Univ., 725 A.2d 472, 477 (D.C. 1999), the absence of a proffer showing a "substantial connection" between the insurance carrier and Dr. Hill, such as his involvement as an agent of the insurance company, see Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 662 (D.C. 1985), and our recognition that reference to insurance during a civil trial may be prejudicial, Parks v. Ratcliff, 240 A.2d 659, 660 (D.C. 1968), we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by disallowing cross-examination regarding the commonality of insurance carrier between the defense expert and one of the defendant doctors.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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