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George v. Dade3/22/2001
ended a different interpretation"); and Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hospital, 203 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1973) ("The question of the nurse's rights [of indemnity] against the hospital is irrelevant to plaintiff's claim against the nurse"). We conclude that case law from other jurisdictions is not clearly helpful to the resolution of the issue before us.
Consequently, based upon our review of the legal issue presented in this case, the plain words of § 12-309 and § 1-1215 (a) and (b), our prior cases interpreting § 12-309, cases from other jurisdictions, and legislative amendments to notice provisions in some of the other jurisdictions, we conclude that Ms. Dade was not required to give notice to the District prior to filing suit against Dr. George. We reach this conclusion, in part, because we are bound by the plain words of the applicable statutory provisions, in the absence of statutory ambiguity.
As we said in District of Columbia v. Acme Reporting Co., 530 A.2d 708 (D.C. 1987): "' e must look first to the language of the statute and, if it is clear and unambiguous, give effect to its plain meaning.'" Id. at 712 (quoting Office of People's Counsel v. Public Service Commission, 477 A.2d 1079, 1083 (D.C. 1984)). Here, the plain words of the statutes at issue in this case did not require Ms. Dade to give notice of her claim to the District before suing a public medical employee acting within the scope of employment who is required by statute to be indemnified by the District, if he or she lacks insurance.
We are mindful that the District had an opportunity to amend § 12- 309 when it enacted changes to § 1-1215 in the 1970's, but did not. Moreover, where two competing public policies are at work, as here, namely: (1) the policy that the District and its public purse ought to be protected against stale claims by being informed of claims in time to investigate them, determine the facts, and settle meritorious demands; and (2) the policy that one who is injured should not be left to suffer the harsh consequences of the disallowance of a meritorious claim on procedural grounds that are not explicitly based in statute; our duty is not to amend the statutes, but to follow their plain and unambiguous words, absent a clear and indisputable legislative intention to the contrary. Moreover, " f statutes conflict, our task is to reconcile them if possible." Harman, supra, 718 A.2d at 117. In reconciling the statutes, our goal is "'to give effect to the language and intent of both.'" Gonzalez, supra, 498 A.2d at 1174 (quoting District of Columbia v. Smith, 329 A.2d 128, 130 (D.C. 1974)). Consequently, "'where one statute is not irreconcilable with another statute but both statutes can have coincident operation, the court should interpret them so that they are both effective." Id. at 1176. Consistent with this principle, our decision in this case mandates notice, in accordance with § 12-309, where a tort action is maintained against the District of Columbia.
However, under § 1-1215 (b), it permits a claimant to bring suit against a medical employee of the District in his or her individual capacity, without giving notice of claim to the District under § 12-309, even though that employee may be eligible for indemnification by the District.
Accordingly, for the forgoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
So ordered.
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