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Price v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation11/24/2000
) aff'd, 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 55-4-15, 15.1 (1999); id. § 10-8-33. Duncan involved an accident in which a train struck an automobile at a crossing that the plaintiffs claimed was more than ordinarily hazardous. See Duncan, 790 P.2d at 597-98. For purposes of reviewing summary judgment for the defendant railroad, we assumed the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, see id., but held railroads have no duty to upgrade traffic warning devices even at such crossings. See id. at 599. We stated:
Plaintiffs suggest that Union Pacific should have placed warning signs and devices on Droubay Road, including automatic gates blocking traffic on the Road from crossing the tracks when a train was approaching. It is not, however, the responsibility of the railroad to place signs and devices on the public road. The railroad must maintain its own right of way, but it is not under any duty to place signs or devices on the public road. Id.
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed our decision and addressed whether the railroad had a duty to petition UDOT to upgrade the warning devices at the crossing at which the accident occurred--an issue not addressed in the court of appeals opinion. See Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 842 P.2d 832, 833 (Utah 1992). The supreme court held that railroads have no duty to urge or persuade UDOT to upgrade warning devices at crossings. See id. at 833-34. Although the supreme court did not state whether it assumed that the crossing in Duncan was more than ordinarily hazardous, as assumed by the court of appeals, the court's reasoning applies regardless of whether a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous.
As the supreme court explained, state and federal legislatures have put in place a method for prioritizing crossing upgrades. See id. at 834. It was " n view of this careful and orderly approach" that the court declined to impose a duty on railroads to interfere with that process. Id. It is no more appropriate for railroads to interfere in that process when a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous.
The Railroad Defendants had no duty either to install or to request that UDOT install additional or different warning devices at the crossing. Therefore, summary judgment for the Railroad Defendants was appropriate on this issue.
B. Railroad Defendants' Duty to Decrease Train Speed
Plaintiffs next argue the Railroad Defendants should have run their train at a slower speed through the crossing because the crossing constituted an "essentially local safety hazard." We conclude the trial court correctly held Plaintiffs' excessive speed tort claim was preempted, even assuming the crossing is a local safety hazard.
Pursuant to the National Railroad Safety Act (NRSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq., the United States Secretary of Transportation has promulgated regulations establishing speed limits on railroad tracks. See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has noted that federal train speed regulations take into account alignment, curvature, and "hazards posed by track conditions." CSX Trans., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 673-74, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1742 (1993). Accordingly, federal train speed regulations "should be understood as covering the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including the conditions posed by grade crossings." Id. at 675, 113 S. Ct. at 1743 (emphasis added). Because federal regulations cover the subject matter of train speed, state regulation of train speed is preempted. See id. at 675, 113 S. Ct. at 1743.
The NRSA provides a limited exception to federal preemption of state law in the
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