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Price v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation11/24/2000
case of an "essentially local safety hazard." 49 U.S.C.A. § 20106(1) (2000). Specifically, "a State may . . . continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order relating to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order: (1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard." Id. Although the NRSA allows states to regulate train speed legislatively or administratively to ameliorate the effect of a local safety hazard, the NRSA preempts state tort claims based on excessive train speed. See Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675, 113 S. Ct. at 1732; see also O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 960 F. Supp. 1411, 1421 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (holding excessive speed claim preempted because " arning devices, grade, angle, and proximity to highways are all general conditions of crossings that are amenable to uniform, national standards"); Herriman v. Conrail, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 303, 307 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (holding speed claim preempted when background lights obscure train headlight at night); Armstrong v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (holding speed claim preempted despite crossing with heavy vehicular traffic and no automatic gate with flashing lights).
Plaintiffs argue there is an exception to this preemption for state tort claims where there is a "specific, individual hazard." See Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675 n.15. This reference by the Supreme Court in Easterwood has been interpreted to refer to a transient condition that could lead to a particular accident. See, e.g., Armstrong, 844 F. Supp. at 1153 ("The 'specific, individual hazard' identified by the Easterwood court logically relates to the avoidance of a specific collision.").
Only two cases have held a tort claim for excessive speed not preempted. See Stone v. CSX Transp., Inc., 37 F. Supp.2d 789, 794-98 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501, 510 (Tex. App. 1993). In both, transient conditions, which arose after the speed limit for the track was established, either constituted a regulatory violation or imposed a regulatory duty on the railroad that the railroad neglected to perform.
Lemon involved a crossing at which the railroad had parked a line of tank cars in violation of the railroad's own safety rules and state regulations. See 861 S.W.2d at 509. The parked rail cars created a visual obstruction preventing the railroad engineer from seeing the crossing. See id. at 509-10. The court held that the illegally parked tank cars created a specific, individual hazard because " he improper parking of tank cars which obstruct the view of a crossing is not a hazard which the Secretary took into consideration when determining train speed limits." Id. at 510.
Stone involved a malfunctioning automatic crossing gate of which the plaintiff alleged the railroad defendant was aware. See 37 F. Supp.2d at 791-92. Federal regulations impose specific obligations upon a railroad receiving a report of a false activation, and the defendant in Stone did not undertake to fulfill those obligations. See id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 234.107 (1999)). The court held that the plaintiff could proceed under a claim of negligence per se, as the alleged negligence was a violation of federal regulations. See id. at 795. The court also held that a separate claim of negligence was not preempted because the malfunctioning gate constituted a specific individual hazard. See id. at 795-96. The court was careful to point out that federal regulation of train speeds would not be displaced under the limited circumstances of that case. See id. at 796.
No similar circumstances in the present case render the 10200 South crossing a "spe
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