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Price v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation11/24/2000
cific, individual hazard." Rather, the conditions at the crossing at the time of the accident are as they were when the speed limit for the track was established and violated no statute or regulation.
Plaintiffs allege that, like the malfunctioning gates in Stone, the passive warnings in place at the time of the accident were defective. However, Plaintiffs have adduced no credible evidence of such defectiveness. On the contrary, undisputed evidence established that the first two cars in the caravan stopped and that all witnesses knew they were at a railroad crossing. Although different warning devices might have been more effective, the devices in place were not defective. Thus we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' excessive speed claim against the Railroad Defendants.
C. Amtrak's Duty to Brake
Next, Plaintiffs argue Amtrak breached a duty to brake the engine at the crossing because the crew knew or should have known that a collision was imminent as the train crew admitted they saw the three cars approach the crossing and worried that they might try to cross in front of the train. In effect, Plaintiffs argue that the three cars at the crossing constituted a specific local safety hazard. See O'Bannon, 960 F. Supp. at 1420-21 (" 'specific individual hazard' must be a discrete and truly local hazard, such as a child standing on the railway."); Thompson v. CSX Transp., Inc., Civ. No. 1:97cv528GR (S.D. Miss. Sept. 14, 1999) ("A specific local safety hazard must be a condition so unusual that the Secretary could not have considered such in making a determination of train speed limits under the FRSA, as in the case in which an engineer sees a motorist stranded on the tracks, but fails to stop or slow to avoid the collision.").
Utah law speaks to a train operator's duty to apply an emergency brake:
The motorman or engineer operating a train may assume, and act in reliance on the assumption, that a person on or approaching a crossing is in possession of his natural faculties and aware of the situation, including the fact that a train is a large and cumbersome instrumentality which is difficult to stop, and that the person will exercise ordinary care and take reasonable precautions for his own safety. If, consistent with his duty of due care, anything appears so that he either knows or should know that there is a likelihood of danger to a person near the tracks, it becomes his duty to use all reasonable efforts to give warnings, to slacken his speed, and if possible, to stop in time to avert an accident. The duty is measured by the exigencies of the occasion. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 252, 282 P.2d 335, 338 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
Under Lawrence, a duty to brake arises only when the operator "knows or should know that there is a likelihood of danger to a person near the tracks." Id. As the Washington Supreme Court has stated:
ne operating a locomotive and train has a right to assume, until the contrary becomes evident, that one approaching the track in an automobile will give the train the right of way, and is not required to attempt to bring his train to a standstill because the automobile may be seen to be approaching the track, but has a right to assume, until the contrary appears, that the occupants of such automobile will use reasonable care for their protection, and will give the train the right of way to which it is entitled under the law. Klouse v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 312 P.2d 647, 651 (Wash. 1957) (quoted by Power v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 655 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981)).
We conclude under the undisputed facts in the present case that the train op
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