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LaForte v. Bandoli11/7/2000
let him know that Bandoli wanted him to leave: a bar glass, an ashtray, pizza and a television remote control. Bandoli admits that the bar glass hit LaForte. In contrast, LaForte in his deposition claimed that Bandoli threw two bar glasses and an ashtray and that LaForte was struck all three times. Bandoli and LaForte also disagree about what may have been said between the two men in the hours before the incident, how much each man had to drink and how far apart they were at the time the objects where thrown.
. Based on our review of the briefs and the record, we are convinced that these disputed facts are material because they may affect the determination of Bandoli's intent. Even Society appears to implicitly acknowledge that the disputed facts may be relevant to a determination of intent. In its brief, Society states:
It is incredulous for Mr. Bandoli to argue that he only intended to "scare" Mr. LaForte and not injure him. If he had only hit him once, he might have a better argument. However, by hitting Mr. LaForte three times at close range, it is obvious he intended to injure Mr. LaForte.
By basing its argument on a disputed fact, i.e., whether LaForte was hit once or three times, Society undermines its contention that summary judgment is appropriate in this case.
. Assuming arguendo that we were to determine that only the undisputed facts (i.e., that Bandoli threw a glass at least seven feet and that it hit LaForte in the head) were material, summary judgment is still inappropriate because the undisputed facts do not fall within the exceptional situations where intent can be inferred as a matter of law. An intentional-acts exclusion like the one in Society's policy precludes insurance coverage where the insured acts intentionally and intends some injury or harm to follow from his or her acts. See Ludwig v. Dulian, 217 Wis. 2d 782, 788, 579 N.W.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1998). Intentional acts preclude coverage when they are substantially certain to produce injury even if the insured asserts that he or she did not intend any harm. See id. Intent may be actual (a subjective standard) or inferred by the nature of the insured's intentional act (an objective standard). See Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150, 168, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991). Therefore, an intentional-acts exclusion precludes insurance coverage where an intentional act is substantial enough to produce injury even if the insured asserts, honestly or dishonestly, that he or she did not intend any harm. See id.
. Ordinarily, the question whether an insured intended harm or injury to result from an intentional act is a question of fact. See Schwersenska v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 206 Wis. 2d 549, 554, 557 N.W.2d 469 (Ct. App. 1996). However, a court may infer that an insured intended to injure or harm as a matter of law if the degree of certainty that the conduct will cause injury is sufficiently great to justify inferring intent as a matter of law. See id. There is no bright-line rule to determine when intent to injure should be inferred as a matter of law. See Ludwig, 217 Wis. 2d at 789. Rather, each set of facts must be considered on a case-by-case basis. See id. The more likely it is that harm will result from certain intentional conduct, the more likely it is that intent to harm will be inferred as a matter of law. See id.
. Wisconsin courts have approved of inferring an insured's intent to injure as a matter of law under limited circumstances. In N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 84, 450 N.W.2d 445 (1990), and K.A.G. v. Stanford, 148 Wis. 2d 158, 434 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1988), the courts held that an insured's intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law,
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