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Wiseman v. Alliant Hospitals3/22/2001
e of limitations. See Hall supra.
Appellant's deposition reveals that shortly after her surgery in 1989, she began experiencing pain of an unknown origin. Appellant testified that she suspected her problems stemmed from the 1989 surgery. In fact, in giving her medical history to doctors in Georgia, she even traced her pain to that date. Furthermore, she testified that when she saw the piece of metal which Dr. Cummings extracted from her leg, it confirmed her suspicion that its origin was the 1989 procedure performed by Dr. Ulfe. Some may interpret Appellant's testimony that while she may not have known the full extent of her injury , she knew as early as two weeks after her surgery in 1989 that she was suffering the harmful effects of something that went wrong during that surgery. Appellant may have even been skeptical about Dr. Hilgeford's 1989 diagnosis of a broken tailbone, evidently believing throughout the years the root of her problem was the conization and D&C;procedure performed by Dr. Ulfe.
Notwithstanding, while Appellant may have suspected that something went wrong during the surgery, that in and of itself was insufficient to accrue a cause of action. One who possesses no medical knowledge should not be held responsible for discovering an injury based on the wrongful act of a physician. The nature of the tort and the character of the injury usually require reliance on what the patient is told by the physician or surgeon. The fiduciary relationship between the parties grants a patient the right to rely on the physician's knowledge and skill. Black v. Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d 469 (N.C. 1985).
The trial court erroneously equated "harm" with "injury." Such ruling ignores the tenuous nature of predicting medical results, and is particularly inappropriate when viewed in the context of a motion for summary judgment. Appellant was aware of the "harm" done to her well before she discovered that she had been the victim of medical malpractice. However, her cause of action did not accrue until the fact of her injury became objectively ascertainable.
A legally recognizable injury does not exist until the plaintiff discovers the defendant's wrongful conduct. Because Appellant's injury was not readily apparent until the discovery of the piece of uterine probe, she was unaware that she had a viable claim for medical malpractice. A mere suspicion of injury due to medically unexplainable pain following an invasive surgery does not equate to discovery of medical negligence. "To require a man to seek a remedy before he knows of his rights, is palpably unjust .I' Wilkinson v. Harrinaton, 243 A.2d 745, 753 (R.I. 1968). In order to trigger the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must discover the injury -- the invasion of a legally protected interest. Appellant filed her medical malpractice complaint within one year from the date she became aware she had been injured as a result of Dr. Ulfe's negligence. As such, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All concur.
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