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Estate of Powell v. Powell9/29/2000
ment. A declaration by the trustors that they hold property in trust for another is sufficient to transfer real property to a trust. (Prob. Code, ยง 15200, subd. (a); Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) " here is no requirement that the settlor/trustee execute a separate writing conveying the property to the trust." (16 Cal.App.4th at p. 948.)
III. Separate Property Contributions
William argues he is entitled to much more than half of the Weaverville residence because a significant amount of his separate property can be traced to its purchase and improvement. William argues he owned a home in Long Beach before his marriage to Myrtle, sold it and bought two other lots, one of which he put in his name and the other in Myrtle's name. These were later sold, and the proceeds put into the Weaverville residence. William further argues he received a personal injury award during the marriage and this too was put into the Weaverville residence.
As indicated previously, the trial court concluded all property owned by the couple at the time of Myrtle's death was held as community property. According to the court, neither party presented sufficient evidence to trace the property back to a separate source.
Given the 35-year span of the marriage, it is hard to see how the trial court could have concluded otherwise. It is not enough simply to prove that a separate property asset was sold during the marriage and another asset was purchased. Because separate property is subject to the complete control of the spouse owning it, " hen that spouse voluntarily decides to use separate property for community purposes, it is logical to imply a gift of that property to the community in the absence of any agreement or understanding to the contrary." (In re Marriage of Devlin (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 804, 809.) Here, there was no evidence of an agreement that use of the proceeds from the sale of the Long Beach property to acquire community assets was other than a gift. Furthermore, in light of the trial court's finding that William and Myrtle lived together for five years before the marriage, a finding William does not dispute, there is some doubt about the separate nature of the Long Beach property in any event.
As to the personal injury recovery, the evidence presented established this as a community asset. As a general rule, personal injury damages received during a marriage are community property. (In re Marriage of Devlin, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 807.) In this instance, such conclusion is even more compelling given the evidence that William retired five years before Myrtle because of disability. The natural inference is that the personal injury recovery served in lieu of income William would have received. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that all property was community property.
IV. Exhibit A to the 1991 Trust
William's final argument is incomprehensible. The caption of the argument refers to lack of an exhibit "A" to the 1991 trust. However, in the body of the argument William complains that Ronald introduced exhibit 1 which he claimed to have been exhibit A to the 1988 trust. William testified exhibit 1 was not attached to the 1988 trust when he signed it. The 1988 trust has no bearing on this matter, having been superseded by the 1991 trust. William does not contend there was no exhibit attached to the 1991 trust.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. (CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.)
HULL , J.
We concur:
SIMS , Acting P.J.
NICHOLSON , J.
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