 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Town of Alma v. Azco Construction9/18/2000
ome. See id. at 1045. We allowed the negligence claim for latent defects in the home because we determined that a builder has an independent duty to act without negligence in the construction of a home. See id. at 1042.
Accordingly, as we determine that Petitioners' negligence claim is based solely on the breach of a contractual duty resulting in purely economic loss, and thus is barred by application of the economic loss rule, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Petitioners' negligence claim.
F. Attorney's Fees
Petitioners contend that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order denying attorney's fees to AZCO. Despite the existence of a contractual provision providing that the prevailing party in any litigation shall be entitled to an award of their legal expenses, Petitioners argue that because it never appropriated money for such fees, any award is barred by section 29-1-110, 9 C.R.S. (1999). We disagree.
The contract entered into between Petitioners and AZCO contained the following provision in section 3.26.1 of the "special conditions" of the contract:
If any litigation results from any claims, disputes or other matters in question arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the breach thereof, the successful party in the litigation shall be entitled to reasonable legal expenses as part of any judgment.
Based on this provision, AZCO moved for an award of attorney's fees after prevailing on the breach of contract claim at trial. The trial court denied the request on three independent bases. However, only the appropriations issue was raised in the petition for certiorari. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order, finding that section 24-9-103.6, 7 C.R.S. (1999) barred Petitioners from relying on section 29-1-110 as a defense to an award of attorney's fees.
Section 29-1-110(1) prohibits municipalities from spending money in excess of the amounts appropriated by budget. The prohibition on spending funds in excess of amounts appropriated by budget is not absolute. Section 24-91-103.6(4) contains the following exception for certain claims between a public entity and a contractor:
In the event that a good faith dispute arises between a public entity and a contractor concerning the contractor's right to receive additional compensation under a remedy-granting provision of the public works contract, it shall not be a defense to a civil action for payment to such claim that no moneys have been appropriated for such claimed amounts, so long as the contractor has complied with all provisions of the contract applicable to the dispute . . . . As used in this subsection (4), "remedy-granting provision" means any contract clause which permits additional compensation in the event that a specific contingency or event occurs . . . . (Emphasis added.)
Petitioners argue that this section does not apply because AZCO's post-trial motion for attorney's fees does not qualify as a "civil action" within the meaning of the statute. A court's primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. See Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 1992). Petitioners' argument rests on an unduly restrictive interpretation of the general term "civil action" and is inconsistent with the legislature's general intent as expressed in the statute. The General Assembly included the following statement in the "legislative declaration" to the statute:
The general assembly hereby further finds and declares . . . that public construction projects are subject to public appropriation laws which m
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Colorado Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|