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Slooten v. Estate Of Schneider-Janzen3/6/2001
stions of law that we review de novo. See Stoebe v. Merastar Ins. Co., 554 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1996) (examining rule of civil procedure under de novo standard); McBride v. Bitner, 310 N.W.2d 558, 561-63 (Minn. 1981) (examining the propriety of service of process under a de novo standard).
In Minnesota, a civil action is commenced against a defendant by serving a summons on that defendant. Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01. If the defendant dies prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, the claim against the deceased individual abates. Zahler v. Manning, 295 N.W.2d 511, 512 n.2 (Minn. 1980). By virtue of the survivorship statute, a claim against a decedent may be brought against the personal representative of the decedent's estate. Minn. Stat. §á573.01 (1998); see also Minn. Stat. §á524.3-104 (1998) (no proceeding to enforce a claim against an estate may be commenced before the appointment of a personal representative). A personal representative is someone who is qualified to serve in that capacity, is appointed by the court, and accepts the appointment. See Minn. Stat. §á524.3-601 (1998) (before receiving letters, the personal representative must qualify with the appointing court); Minn. Stat. §á524.3-602 (1998) (by accepting appointment, a personal representative submits to the jurisdiction of the court for any proceeding relating to the estate).
Having the capacity to be sued, the personal representative becomes the proper defendant for claims against a decedent's estate:
The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to jurisdiction, to obtain payment of the claim against the estate * * *. Minn. Stat. §á524.3-804(2) (1998).
As the supreme court said in Wood v. Martin, 328 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. 1983): "A cause of action does not exist in the abstract; it exists against somebody." Here, that "somebody" is Schneider-Janzen during her lifetime and her duly-appointed personal representative after her death. Like the plaintiff in Wood, Van Slooten has sued neither person and therefore she never commenced an action that could reach Schneider-Janzen's estate. The district court did not err in holding that the action had not been properly commenced.
But the district court erred in holding that an action may be maintained because Daniel Janzen had actual notice of the claim. Janzen personally had no responsibility for the occurrence. Nor was he an owner of his wife's automobile so as to subject him to vicarious liability. He is not the personal representative of his wife's estate and there is no evidence to suggest that he would qualify for or even accept such appointment. We are aware of no law that makes him a presumptive personal representative for purposes of bringing a claim against the estate. Notice to Janzen of a claim against his deceased wife's estate is of no legal significance. Service of process on Janzen was insufficient to commence an action against the estate of Schneider-Janzen and the district court erred by failing to grant Janzen's motion to dismiss the lawsuit.
Finally, Van Slooten argues that the amended summons and complaint relate back to the original summons and complaint, which were served before the expiration of the statute of limitations. The flaw in Van Slooten's argument is that the relation-back doctrine under Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 does not allow the creation of a lawsuit when action has not been properly commenced in the first instance. See Regie de l'assurance Auto. du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Minn. 1987) (refusing to allow a relation-back amendment to a subrogation claim that should have been brought as a wrongful-death
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