 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group3/6/2001
mary judgment record would support the fact that the appellant could have conceivably established at trial that the respondent's medical staff had a duty not only to its patient, Schmidt, but to the general public to warn Schmidt not to drive while under the influence of Compazine, which, unbeknownst to her, caused drowsiness and dizziness. In this regard, the summary judgment record on which the appellant was entitled to rely to defeat the respondent's motion for summary judgment reflects that Schmidt received an injection of Compazine from the respondent's medical staff for complaints of a headache, which drug was known to the medical staff, but not Schmidt, to cause drowsiness and dizziness which would impair her ability to drive. The record favorable to the appellant would further reflect that the staff did not warn Schmidt not to drive due to the side effects associated with taking Compazine, which she proceeded to do shortly thereafter, resulting in the accident with the appellant.
As noted, supra, summary judgment will not lie for the defendant, if the appellant could succeed on her claim on any theory. Moreland, 995 S.W.2d at 516. As such, despite the fact that she could not maintain a medical malpractice claim against the respondent, because we find that the appellant could conceivably establish at trial a duty of the respondent to the appellant to warn Schmidt not to drive while under the influence of the Compazine, summary judgment for the respondent on the ground that she could not establish at trial a duty on which to predicate a claim against the respondent for negligence of its medical staff was error.
II.
In Point II, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment on her negligence claim based on a lack of causation because, as a matter of law, on the undisputed material facts alleged by the respondent and admitted to by the appellant, and the facts still in dispute, a reasonable fact finder could find that the respondent's alleged negligent acts or omissions in its treatment and care of Schmidt were the direct and proximate cause of the appellant's injuries sustained in the accident. The respondent contends that even if we were to find in Point I that the appellant could conceivably establish at trial a duty from the respondent's medical staff, which was breached, that the appellant's claim still must fail as a matter of law in that such a breach was not the direct and proximate cause of the appellant's injuries. We disagree.
The respondent contends that the undisputed facts alleged in its motion established as a matter of law that any breach of duty on its part as to the care and treatment of Schmidt was not the direct and proximate cause of the appellant's injuries such that summary judgment for it was proper in that causation, as discussed, supra, is, in fact, a necessary element of proof of the appellant's negligence claim. Robinson, 24 S.W.3d at 77. Specifically, it contends that Schmidt's decision to drive after receiving an injection of Compazine was an intervening cause that broke any causal link between any alleged act of negligence by the respondent's medical staff and the injuries sustained by the appellant. In Point I, we determined that the appellant, on the summary judgment record before us, could conceivably establish at trial a duty to her from the respondent's medical staff to warn Schmidt not to drive under the influence of the Compazine and a breach of that duty. Thus, if the summary judgment record here is sufficient for us to conclude that a reasonable fact finder could find that this breach was the direct and proximate cause of the appellant's injuries, then summary judgment
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Missouri Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|