 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group3/6/2001
ng proximate cause absolves those actors whom it would be 'unfair' to punish because of the attenuated relation which their conduct bears to the plaintiff's injury. . . .
The general test of proximate cause is whether an injury is the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligence. This is determined by looking back, after the occurrence, and examining whether the injury appears to be a reasonable and probable consequence of the conduct. rom the essential meaning of proximate cause arises the principle that in order for an act to constitute the proximate cause of an injury, some injury, if not the precise one in question, must have been reasonably foreseeable. Foreseeability is not a matter of mathematical certainty. No event is entirely foreseeable. As such, the test for proximate cause is not whether a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the particular injury, but whether, after the occurrences, the injury appears to be the reasonable and probable consequence of the act or omission of the defendant. It is only necessary that the party charged knew or should have known there was an appreciable chance some injury would result. Robinson, 24 S.W.3d at 77-78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Applying the foregoing standard of proximate cause, we would first note that for the same public policy considerations discussed in Point I as to duty, we do not view it as being unfair to hold a physician responsible for an injury to a member of the general public for the physician's failure to warn a patient not to drive under the influence of an intoxicating drug which the physician prescribed. As to the appellant's injuries being the natural and probable consequence of the respondent's medical staff's failure to warn Schmidt not to drive, it appears to us that a fact finder at trial could so find. Obviously, a physician would or should know that unless warned not to drive, there is an appreciable chance that a patient under his or her care, which patient is unaware of the intoxicating side effects of a drug which the physician has prescribed, would drive under the influence thereof, presenting a likelihood of harm to others as well as herself. Further, as noted, supra, the record would support a possible finding that the Compazine caused Schmidt to doze off while driving, causing her to cross the center line and hit the appellant's vehicle. As such, injuries resulting from the patient's driving under the influence could be found to be the natural, reasonable and probable consequence of the failure of the physician to warn the patient not to drive.
The respondent argues that the undisputed facts would demonstrate that Schmidt's act of driving constituted an intervening cause that cut off any liability of the respondent. In this regard, the respondent argues that any causal link between the respondent's medical staff's failure to warn and the appellant's injuries was broken because Schmidt "chose to drive, may or may not have known of her impaired condition, may have consumed sufficient alcohol to independently be in an impaired condition, and may have caused the crash intentionally or negligently for some reason unrelated to drowsiness." (Emphasis added.) We disagree.
"An intervening cause is a new and independent force which so interrupts the chain of events that it becomes the responsible, direct, proximate, and immediate cause of the injury, but it may not consist of an act of concurring or contributory negligence." Simonian v. Gevers Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Mo. App. 1997) (citation omitted). "However, the mere existence of an intervening act is not decisive. The intervening act must be a superseding cause that
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Missouri Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|