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Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group3/6/2001
is independent of the original actor's negligence and severs the connection between the original actor's conduct and the plaintiff's injury as a matter of law." Buchholz v. Mosby-Year Book, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. App. 1998) (citation omitted). Here, a fact finder could reasonably find that Schmidt's act of driving her vehicle over the center line of the roadway and colliding with the appellant's vehicle was not independent of the respondent's medical staff's failure to warn her in that a fact finder could find that she chose to drive under the influence of Compazine, unaware of its intoxicating side effects and the danger she posed thereby to herself and the motoring public, which resulted in her driving across the center line in the road and hitting the appellant's vehicle. The mere act of choosing to drive would not be an intervening cause. As discussed in Young, 916 S.W.2d at 878, it is the choice of driving when the driver knows of the associated dangers that cuts off causation. Although the fact finder at trial might well infer, as the respondent contends, that Schmidt was aware of the dangers of driving under the influence of Compazine, the summary judgment record before us indicates that the contrary might be found. " here the record contains competent evidence of 'two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts,'" a genuine issue of fact exists which would defeat summary judgment based on such an account. Williams v. Mo. Highway and Transp. Comm'n, 16 S.W.3d 605, 613 (Mo. App. 2000) (citation omitted). Because we believe that a fact finder could find either way on the issue of whether Schmidt was aware of the dangers in driving while under the influence of Compazine, for purposes of summary judgment, her choice in driving would not be an intervening cause.
As to the other "possible" causes for the accident intervening to cut off any causal link for a failure to warn, as asserted by the respondent, they are just that --- possibilities, which would be fact issues for a fact finder at trial. By couching its argument in terms of "may," the respondent, in effect, concedes on appeal that based on the summary judgment record before us, a fact finder may find that the accident was caused by an impairment not associated with the taking of the Compazine, specifically that the accident was caused by Schmidt's consumption of alcohol or by an attempt at suicide. As such, summary judgment would not lie in that a genuine issue of a material fact would exist as to what caused Schmidt to drive across the center line of the road. Id. Of course, the possibility also exists that a fact finder might find that the accident had multiple causes, for example, impairment due to drinking in combination with taking Compazine. Under such circumstance, Schmidt's drinking would not necessarily be an intervening cause:
The general rule is that if a defendant is negligent and his negligence combines with that of another, or with any other independent, intervening cause, he is liable, although his negligence was not the sole negligence or the sole proximate cause, and although his negligence, without such other independent, intervening cause, would not have produced the injury . Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., 979 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Mo. banc 1998) (quoting Gaines v. Prop. Serv. Co., 276 S.W.2d 169, 173-74 (Mo. 1955)).
As such, the respondent would not be entitled to summary judgment in reliance on its alleged undisputed facts that are susceptible to more than one interpretation, which are contradictory, as to what caused Schmidt to drive across the center line. Williams, 16 S.W.3d at 613.
For the reasons stated, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to th
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