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Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group3/6/2001
iled to take adequate precautions to avoid Verlea R. Schmidt leaving the hospital and to be in a position to operate the motor vehicle when her ability was impaired due to medical treatment rendered at the Defendants facility, when it knew or should have known that she was a hazard to herself and others, including this Plaintiff;
h. Defendant carelessly and negligently failed to notify any police authorities or take any other actions concerning Verlea R. Schmidt's leaving the hospital thereby allowing her to be in a position to operate the motor vehicle when it knew or should have known that her ability was impaired, making her a hazard to herself and others, including this Plaintiff.
With respect to these allegations of negligence, the respondent asserted in its motion for summary judgment that the appellant was attempting to recover against it for medical malpractice, requiring: "(1) proof that defendant's act or omission failed to meet the requisite standard of care; (2) proof that the act or omission was performed negligently; and (3) proof of a causal connection between the act or omission and the injury sustained by the plaintiff." Super v. White, 18 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Mo. App. 2000) (citation omitted). As to these elements of required proof, the respondent further asserted in its motion that the appellant would never be able to establish the elements of duty and causation, which, employing the second means available to a defending party for establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment, entitled it to summary judgment on the appellant's claim against it. In support of its assertion that the appellant would not be able to show at trial the requisite duty owed, the issue in this point, the respondent alleged that it was undisputed that the appellant was not a patient of the medical staff of the respondent, which is a required element of proof in establishing a medical malpractice claim against it.
The appellant concedes, as she did below, that she cannot make a medical malpractice claim against the respondent because she was not a patient of the respondent's medical staff. Nonetheless, she asserts that summary judgment for the respondent was improper in that, on the undisputed and disputed facts, she could establish her claim for damages against the respondent under a theory of general negligence. The respondent, however, contends on appeal, as it did below, that as a matter of law the appellant could not establish a general negligence claim against it because the appellant, as the non-movant, based on the facts on which she was entitled to rely, could never demonstrate the requisite elements of a duty of care and causation for such a claim. Inasmuch as summary judgment for the respondent would have been improper unless it demonstrated that the appellant was not entitled to recover as a matter of law under any theory pled, Rule 74.04(c); Moreland v. Farren-Davis, 995 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Mo. App. 1999) (citations omitted) (holding that to be entitled to summary judgment on the entire claim of a plaintiff, a defendant/movant "must demonstrate that is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on any theory of recovery within the scope of the plaintiff's petition"), the question then for us to decide is whether on the material facts not in dispute and those facts still in dispute, the appellant, as the non-movant, could have established the requisite proof elements of a general negligence claim against the respondent, specifically in this point, whether she could establish that the respondent owed her a duty of care.
To succeed on a claim of general negligence against the respondent, the appellant was required to plead and prove: (1) a duty owed by the respondent; (
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