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State v. Gonzales3/26/2001
of a youthful offender under Section 32A-2-3(I).
In conclusion, we hold that Apprendi is inapplicable to the Section 32A-2-20(B) findings.
3. State Constitution
New Mexico cases have never articulated the standard of proof pursuant to which the findings required by Section 32A-2-20 are to be made. Prior versions of the children's code statutorily established the very low standard of "reasonable grounds to believe" that the enumerated crime was committed and required simple consideration of whether the child was amenable to treatment as a juvenile. See State v. Doe, 103 N.M. 233, 238-40, 704 P.2d 1109, 1114-16 (Ct. App. 1985). Under the current statute, the trial court must make a specific finding that the child is not amenable. Whatever the current standard of proof is for the trial court to make this specific finding, whether it is preponderance of the evidence as advocated by the State or something higher, we review the trial court's decision for substantial evidence, see In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, 15, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318, or abuse of discretion, see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017.
Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature's intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. Second, a probation revocation hearing, like an adjudication, requires proof that a defendant is guilty of an act that occurred in the past. The Legislature's distinction between the proof required for a finding of guilt versus the proof required to find an adjudicated youthful offender non-amenable to treatment as a child is consistent with federal and state precedent. Compare id. with Kent, 383 U.S. at 547-48.
We note that New Mexico courts have consistently held that the lack of a standard of proof for the amenability findings does not violate due process under the federal constitution. See State v. Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 461-62, 286 P.2d 306, 311-12 (1955) (upholding law allowing any child charged with a felony to be prosecuted in district court); State v. Jimenez, 84 N.M. 335, 336, 503 P.2d 315, 316 (1972) (holding transfer statute constitutional and noting that revised statute gave greater guidance to trial courts in determining whether juvenile should be tried in adult court than statute upheld in Doyal); State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 506, 509-10, 576 P.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right, but a right granted by the Legislature and statute met basic due process requirements); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1983) (holding statute which required consideration, rather than a finding, of amenability was constitutional); In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, 5-8 (holding that current statute meets due process requirements and that federal constitution does not require a particular standard of proof); Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, 9 (holding that decision to sentence juvenile as an adult subject to abuse of discretion review).
Finally, when compared with the laws of other states, the lack of a discernible standard in Section 32A-2-20 appears in keeping with the majori
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