Chase Scientific Research3/22/2001
ttorneys must complete at least one academic year as a matriculated student at an approved law school as well as an aggregate of four years in the supervised study of law in a New York State law office, with credit for law school attendance (22 NYCRR 520.4 ); engineers, architects and accountants also face extensive work experience requirements (Education Law §7206 [engineers, 12 years]; Education Law §7304 [architects, 12 years]; Education Law §7404 [accountants, 15 years]).
Nor are insurance agents and brokers bound by a standard of conduct for which discipline might be imposed (see, e.g., 22 NYCRR 603 [attorney discipline]; Education Law §§ 6509, 6510, 6511 [professional misconduct, proceedings and discipline for accountants, architects, engineers and others, but not insurance agents or brokers]). Moreover, as this Court recently made clear, an insurance agent has a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage, but generally not a continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a client based on a special relationship of trust and confidence (Murphy v Kuhn, supra, 90 NY2d, at 273). To be sure, insurance agents and brokers are held to high standards of education and qualification (see, e.g., Insurance Law §§ 2103, 2104), but these criteria are simply not as rigorous as those embraced by what we conclude are the professionals within CPLR 214(6).
Thus, in both cases we conclude that the actions against defendant agents and brokers are governed not by CPLR 214(6), but by the limitations periods applicable to negligence actions (CPLR 214 ) and breach of contract actions (CPLR 213 ). In Chase (but not Gugliotta) plaintiff argues that -- even applying CPLR 214(4) -- its negligence cause of action should be reinstated, and we agree. Plaintiff's action was commenced on January 7, 1999, within three years of what both parties agree was the accrual date for the negligence claim, January 19, 1996. In both cases the "continuous treatment" doctrine is inapplicable. Finally, while plaintiffs' contract claims were indisputably brought within six years of accrual and thus must be reinstated, we note that the sole issue before us is the applicable statute of limitations. No challenge has been made to the viability of the breach of contract claims, and we do not pass on them.
Accordingly, in Chase the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the complaint reinstated. In Gugliotta, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be modified, without costs, to reinstate the cause of action for breach of contract as against Apollo, and otherwise affirmed.
Case No. 24: Order reversed, with costs, and defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint denied. Opinion by Chief Judge Kaye. Judges Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley, Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur.
Case No. 25: Order, insofar as appealed from, modified, without costs, by reinstating the cause of action for breach of contract against defendant Apollo Roland Brokerage, Inc. and, as so modified, affirmed.
Opinion by Chief Judge Kaye.
Judges Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley, Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur.
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