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Brown v. Boor9/13/2000
"chronic pain syndrome," which in turn has caused a "major reactive depression." His expert witness opined his earlier symptoms of depression were merely "dysthymia" and that Brown's current depression is major and is reaction to the chronic pain syndrome.
In the review-reopening proceedings, the Commissioner determined Brown's current chronic pain and depression are just more of the same conditions he had at the time of the 1994 arbitration. Therefore Brown is not entitled to additional benefits. See Williamson v. Wellman Fansteel, 595 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1999). Brown argues the chronic pain syndrome and major reactive depression are new and different conditions. He asserts the agency erred in not giving appropriate weight to his expert's uncontroverted testimony. The agency discounted Dr. Cavallin's opinions because he examined Brown only after the 1994 arbitration. His only knowledge of Brown's earlier condition came from a review of Brown's medical records and Brown's own statements. Given the similarity of symptoms, the Commissioner found, "It is very possible that if Dr. Cavallin had examined the claimant in 1994 he would have arrived at the same diagnosis in 1994 as he arrived at in 1995 and 1997." We conclude, as did the district court, that substantial evidence supports the agency's decision.
The agency decision concluded Brown was precluded from litigating again the issue of the causal connection between his depression and his injury because the original arbitration decision determined there was no causal connection. Brown argues issue preclusion does not apply because his current depression is different and distinct from his earlier depression and is a reaction to his chronic pain. In affirming on judicial review, the district court noted the agency took into account the new evidence presented, even though the agency determined res judicata applied to Brown's claim concerning depression.
The initial award determined Brown's depression was not causally related to his injury . Although Brown claims his major reactive depression is a new condition proximately caused by the chronic pain syndrome he developed from his initial injury, a review of his symptoms led the agency to conclude that giving the same symptoms a new name did not merit reopening Brown's award. The district court applied the proper deferential standard of review and affirmed. We conclude the district court did not err in affirming the agency's decision that Brown was precluded from relitigating whether or not his depression was causally related to his injury.
AFFIRMED.
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