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Graber v. City Of Ankeny9/7/2000
tion services, and custodial care. See Schonberger v. Roberts, 456 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1990) (noting that section 668.14 limits the collateral source rule under which "a tortfeasor's obligation to make restitution for an injury he or she caused is undiminished by any compensation received by the injured party from a collateral source").
The plaintiff's constitutional challenge to this statute begins with the premise that because it applies only "in an action brought pursuant to this chapter," see Iowa Code § 668.14(1), it is triggered only by a "claim involving the fault of more than one party to the claim," see id. § 668.3(2). Her argument continues that "blameless plaintiffs" are treated differently depending upon whether they have a claim against one party or more than one party. A blameless plaintiff who sues only one defendant is not subject to chapter 668 and the modified collateral source rule, she asserts, whereas a blameless plaintiff who sues more than one defendant is subject to the collateral source rule of section 668.14(1). The plaintiff argues that this different treatment violates her due process and equal protection rights.
We must reject the plaintiff's argument because it is based upon a faulty premise. This court held in Waterloo Savings Bank v. Austin, 494 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Iowa 1993), that the legislature did not intend by the language used in section 668.3(2) to restrict the application of chapter 668 to claims involving the fault of more than one party. We concluded that chapter 668 applied to any suit in which "fault," as defined by section 668.1, was at issue, regardless of the number of parties allegedly at fault. Waterloo Sav. Bank, 494 N.W.2d at 717 (holding that chapter 668 applies to all actions alleging a non-intentional tort resulting in injury or death to persons or damage to property). Therefore, the plaintiff's underlying assumption—that section 668.14(1) does not apply in suits where a blameless plaintiff sues only one defendant—is not true. Accordingly, her constitutional claims fail.
V. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Failing to Sustain the Plaintiff's Objections to the Questioning of her Expert Witness by the Defendant?
The plaintiff objected to the defendant's cross-examination of her expert witness concerning a one-second perception/reaction time. She objected on the ground that there was no factual basis in the record for the assumption that a one—second perception/reaction time was appropriate. The trial court overruled the plaintiff's objection.
Our review of the record reveals that on direct examination the plaintiff's expert testified that it was possible for Allen to have stopped prior to reaching the intersection under certain assumptions he had made, including a one-second perception/reaction time. On cross-examination, the defendant merely sought to elaborate on this testimony. The plaintiff contends, however, that the evidence showed Allen's perception and reaction were delayed and, therefore, a one-second perception/reaction time was not applicable.
Because the expert gave an opinion on direct that was premised on a one-second perception/reaction time, the trial court did not err in allowing questions on cross-examination that were also premised on a one-second perception/reaction time. Whether this typical perception/reaction time was a reasonable assumption under the circumstances of this case was a disputed issue for the jury to resolve.
VI. Did the Trial Court Err in Allowing Expert Testimony by a City Employee?
Prior to trial the district court ruled that the City could not present expert testimony because it had failed to timely designate an expert witn
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