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Graber v. City Of Ankeny9/7/2000
signal, giving vehicles an opportunity to clear the intersection before cross-traffic is released with a green light.) Instead of the requested instruction, the trial court gave instruction 26, which informed the jury as follows with respect to a red clearance interval:
The yellow vehicle change interval may be followed by a red clearance interval of sufficient duration to permit traffic to clear the intersection before conflicting traffic movements are released.
This language is taken from the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, which the City is required to follow. See Iowa Code §§ 321.252, .255; Iowa Admin. Code r. 761—130.1 (1996).
Clearly, the instruction given by the court is an accurate statement of Iowa law. Moreover, instruction 26 duplicates that portion of the plaintiff's requested instruction that the red clearance interval should be "of sufficient duration to allow those vehicles . . . who were in the intersection when it was displayed to clear the intersection." The court was not required to use the plaintiff's preferred language so long as the instruction embodied the same legal principle.
That brings us to the portion of the plaintiff's requested instruction not contained in instruction 26: that the red clearance light be of sufficient duration to allow the clearance of "vehicles who could not stop safely prior to its display." This additional qualification with respect to the duration of a red clearance light is not contained in the Manual, nor has the plaintiff cited any other statute or case that imposes this requirement. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on this concept.
E. Speed.
The plaintiff objected to the court's instruction, "At the time and place and with the motor vehicle involved in this case, any speed over 55 miles per hour was unlawful." The plaintiff complains that there was no testimony that anyone involved in this collision was traveling in excess of 55 miles per hour. We think there was testimony in the record, however, from which the jury could conclude that Allen was traveling over 55 miles per hour. When asked "how may seconds was the red light on before you hit Mrs. Graber's car?" Allen responded, "I don't know how many seconds. Seconds go real fast when you're going 60, 55, 60. It's kind of a high speed." As noted earlier, in considering whether there is substantial evidence in support of an instruction, we must construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the court's decision. In doing so here, we think the quoted testimony supported the court's instruction and, therefore, the court did not err in submitting this instruction to the jury.
IV. Whether the Application of Iowa Code Section 668.14(1) to This Case Violates the Plaintiff's Right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws Under the United States and Iowa Constitutions?
Iowa Code section 668.14(1) provides:
In an action brought pursuant to this chapter seeking damages for personal injury , the court shall permit evidence and argument as to the previous payment or future right of payment of actual economic losses incurred or to be incurred as a result of the personal injury for necessary medical care, rehabilitation services, and custodial care except to the extent that the previous payment or future right of payment is pursuant to a state or federal program or from assets of the claimant or the members of the claimant's immediate family.
This statute, where applicable, modifies the common-law collateral source rule by allowing the introduction of evidence of payment by a third party or collateral source of expenses for medical care, rehabilita
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