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Ray v. Herle Hay Mall9/27/2000
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Linda R. Reade Judge.
The plaintiff appeals the district court's ruling denying the motion seeking relief from the operation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 on the dismissal of plaintiff's tort action. AFFIRMED.
Considered en banc.
Una Ray appeals the district court's ruling denying her motion seeking relief from the operation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 on the dismissal of her tort action. We find her action of securing a trial date by stipulation of the parties does not operate to circumvent the required procedure under rule 215.1. This rule mandates application to the court for a continuance to avoid dismissal for failure to try a case prior to the noticed date. Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling Ray's motion to declare Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 inapplicable. Affirmed.
Background facts. Ray filed a personal injury action against Merle Hay Mall, Inc. (Merle Hay) on November 4, 1996. Notice of dismissal under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 was sent to the parties on July 16, 1998, notifying them that the case must be tried by January 2, 1999, or it would be dismissed. Ray sought a Uniform Scheduling Order from the court, which was approved by counsel for Merle Hay. The order was entered and filed on December 28, 1998, setting a trial date of August 2, 1999.
On June 28, 1999, Ray filed a motion to declare Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 inapplicable and, in the alternative, to reinstate her case. The trial court heard arguments on the motion and overruled it. Ray appeals.
Scope of review. This is a law action and we review the district court's decision for error in its application of legal principles. Iowa R. App. P. 4; Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchants Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Iowa 1989). The district court's decision will not be set aside unless induced by an erroneous view of the law. Frantz v. Knights of Columbus, 205 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Iowa 1973).
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1. Ray contends the Uniform Scheduling Order, which set a trial date, insulated this case from the fatal consequences of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1. Except for a small list of exemptions, rule 215.1 requires dismissal of any case that has not proceeded to trial within the prescribed time period. The court has previously stated, rule 215.1 is "positive and definite and . . . clearly mandatory. . . . 'The operation of the rule is not discretionary with the trial court.'" Talbot v. Talbot, 255 Iowa 337, 340, 122 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1963) (quoting Windus v. Great Plains Gas, 254 Iowa 114, 123, 116 N.W.2d 410, 415 (1962)). The rule, however, further provides:
All such cases shall be assigned and tried or dismissed without prejudice at plaintiff's costs unless satisfactory reasons for want of prosecution or grounds for continuance be shown by application and ruling thereon after notice and not ex parte.
No continuance under this rule shall be by stipulation of parties alone but must be by order of court. . . . Iowa R. Civ. P. 215.1.
Ray relies on two interwoven facts to support her position; defense counsel's approval of the scheduling order, setting trial eight months beyond the otherwise mandatory dismissal date under rule 215.1, and the district court's signing of the order. In advancing her argument, Ray cites the following precedent:
We have never said that a case should be dismissed for lack of prosecution while on the active trial assignment, assigned for trial on a date certain and before the arrival of the trial date. Such a ruling would be arbitrary and beyo
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