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State v. Corwin9/7/2000
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis, Judge.
Defendant challenges application of Iowa Code section 910.3B (Supp. 1997) to sentencing upon remand following conviction for homicide by vehicle.
SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Considered en banc.
Donald Corwin stands convicted of two counts of homicide by vehicle. The question is whether, on remand for resentencing from a prior appeal, the district court erred by adding two $150,000 judgments for restitution to Corwin's sentence pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.3B (Supp. 1997), a statute enacted in the interim. We hold the court's application of the new statute to Corwin offended constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws. We therefore vacate that portion of the judgment and remand for a corrected sentence.
The facts are not disputed. In March 1996, Corwin drove while intoxicated and caused a two—car collision that resulted in two deaths. He subsequently pled guilty to two counts of homicide by vehicle. See Iowa Code § 707.6A(1) (1995). The district court imposed two consecutive ten—year terms of imprisonment. Corwin appealed, claiming the court failed to give adequate reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.
In an unpublished opinion dated November 3, 1997, this court vacated Corwin's sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. In the meantime, Corwin had settled the wrongful death and consortium claims brought by the accident victims' estates. Pertinent to this appeal, the legislature had also enhanced the penalty for vehicular homicide and other felonies involving the death of the victim. Effective July 1, 1997, an offender convicted of a felony causing death was required to pay a minimum of $150,000 in restitution to the victim's estate. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 125, § 11 (now codified at Iowa Code § 910.3B (1999)).
The State moved to amend Corwin's sentence on remand to include restitution under Iowa Code section 910.3B. Corwin resisted enforcement of the new statute, claiming—among other things—that its application to him would violate fundamental rules prohibiting ex post facto laws. The district court rejected Corwin's contentions and this appeal followed.
I. Scope of Review.
Because Corwin's challenge to the applicability of section 910.3B raises a constitutional question, our review is de novo. Hills v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 534 N.W.2d 640, 641 (Iowa 1995).
II. Issue on Appeal.
The district court imposed the substantial restitution mandated by section 910.3B over Corwin's protest that applying the new statute to offenses committed prior to its enactment violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of our federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Iowa Const. art. I, § 21. These constitutional provisions forbid the application of a new punitive measure to conduct already committed. State v. Klindt, 542 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Iowa 1996). The clauses are also violated when a statute makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission. Id. Purely civil penalties, however, are not subjected to such restrictions. See Hills, 534 N.W.2d at 641 ("civil penalties do not violate ex post facto clauses, even though their penalties may be retroactive and more burdensome"). Thus the controlling question is "whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity" or merely to impose some restriction on the individual "as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation." State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1997) (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S. Ct. 1146, 1155,
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