 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Sharon Regional Physician Services v. Giannini3/28/2001
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
Defendant-appellant Matthew Giannini appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Court No. 2 which granted judgment for plaintiff- appellee Sharon Regional Physician Services. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After Kevan Newell was injured in an automobile accident, he hired appellant to represent him in his personal injury action. Mr. Newell began receiving treatment from Dr. Mark Sbarro, an employee of appellee, in September 1997. On January 12, 1998, appellant sent a signed letter to Dr. Sbarro which stated:
"Please accept this Letter of Protection in the obligation due and owing by the above-captioned patient for services rendered as a direct result of injuries from which he has filed this personal injury action.
Please be advised that in consideration of your office's forbearance of collection proceedings, upon settlement or judgment of this matter and the receipt of any proceeds in this regard, this office shall make direct payment on the sum due and owing for these services prior to any distribution of proceeds to the client."
Dr. Sbarro continued to provide medical services to Mr. Newell until March 1999 when it was discovered that appellant had received a personal injury settlement check from the tortfeasor and disbursed the funds to Mr. Newell without paying appellee. Thereafter, appellee filed suit against appellant seeking $1,919, the amount of Mr. Newell's unpaid medical bills. Appellee sought to recover from appellant on the theory that appellant's letter of protection created a suretyship by which appellant was obligated to pay unpaid medical bills of Mr. Newell prior to distribution of any settlement or judgment proceeds.
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the letter did not create a suretyship but was just a letter from an attorney on behalf of his client informing Dr. Sbarro of the client's intentions. In the alternative, appellant argued that he was only obligated to pay if a debt existed and because Mr. Newell discharged a debt to Dr. Sbarro in bankruptcy , there was no debt for which appellant is liable as a surety. The parties thereafter stipulated to the facts contained in the pleadings, waived a trial and submitted the case to the court for judgment on the pleadings alone.
On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of appellee. The trial court reasoned that a surety relationship was clearly created when appellant offered to pay appellee prior to disbursement of the personal injury recovery and induced appellee to provide more medical services to Mr. Newell. The court noted that bankruptcy merely discharges the debtor's liability for a debt. The court explained that bankruptcy discharges the right of a creditor to collect against the debtor; however, the creditor can still collect the debt from other liable entities. The within timely appeal followed.
Prior to addressing appellant's arguments, we shall discuss why we are disregarding appellant's statement of the evidence and proceedings which he claims was submitted pursuant to App.R. 9(C). This appellate rule provides that such a statement can be submitted if no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made or if it is unavailable. However, in the case at bar, neither a hearing nor a trial was conducted as the case was submitted on the pleadings. Because the case was submitted to the trial court on the pleadings, it may only be submitted to this court on the pleadings. Thus, a statement under App.R. 9(C) is inappropriate. Moreover, App.R. 9(C) requires tha
Page 1 2 3 4 Ohio Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|