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Dickman v. Elida Community Fire Co.3/29/2001
44.01(C)(2)(a) and 2744.02(A)(1). In addition, R.C. 4765.49(B) provides that a private organization operating under contract with a political subdivision to provide emergency medical services is immune from civil liability. In this scenario, a fundamental right is arguably not involved because such private organization is engaged in providing a governmental function.
When a fundamental right is not involved, a statute comports with due process under the Ohio Constitution "if it bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary." Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 545. Certainly, there is a substantial governmental interest in ensuring necessary emergency medical services for the benefit of the public. R.C. 4765.49(B) operates to provide civil immunity in providing emergency medical services, which presumably will allow the public better access to emergency medical services. Thus, R.C. 4765.49(B) bears a real and substantial relationship to public health or welfare and further it is not unreasonable and arbitrary. We therefore conclude that it does not violate the due process provision of the Ohio Constitution.
Appellant next claims that R.C. 4765.49(B) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution because it in effect creates two different classifications of tort victims to whom emergency medical services are given, those who are treated by a private corporation under contract with a political subdivision and those treated in an emergency room of a hospital. "Where neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved, a legislative classification passes muster if the state can show a rational basis for the unequal treatment of different groups." Fabrey, 70 Ohio St.3d at 353. Accordingly, legislative distinctions are invalid only if they bear no relation to the state's goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them. Id.
As discussed above, the grant of immunity provided in R.C. 4765.49(B) arguably does not involve a fundamental right. Further, no suspect class is involved. The General Assembly can make the rational determination to grant civil immunity to certain emergency medical personnel and agencies under R.C. 4765.49 for negligent acts but deny immunity to emergency room personnel and agencies that can treat the risk under different circumstances. Accordingly, a rational basis can be conceived to justify a classification by taking into consideration the circumstances when the emergency conduct takes place, and thus, R.C. 4765.49(B) does not violate the equal protection provision of the Ohio Constitution.
In sum, we find no merit to appellant's arguments that R.C. 4765.49(B) is unconstitutional. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting ECFC's motion for summary judgment, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
SHAW, HADLEY and BRYANT, JJ., concur.
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