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Merritt v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.9/8/2000
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
Case Summary
Nina Merritt and her daughter (collectively "Merritt") appeal the judgment in favor of the defendant, Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation ("EVSC") in their suit related to injuries sustained on a school playground. We reverse.
Issue
The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court erroneously denied Merritt's challenges for cause of two prospective jurors who were employees of EVSC.
Facts
On October 3, 1996, Merritt fell off the monkey bars on the school playground, sustaining a fracture to her arm. Merritt later sued EVSC, alleging that it failed to maintain an adequate protective surface on the playground to prevent this type of injury.
Among the venire of prospective jurors for the trial were two employees of EVSC. These prospective jurors included Cynthia Carneal, a vice-principal at an elementary school other than the one Merritt attended, and Susan Harp, a teacher at yet another elementary school. During voir dire, Carneal stated that she had worked with Thomas Bennett, the principal of the school where the incident occurred, in summer school. Harp stated that she had known Bennett for approximately twenty years and that she taught kindergarten with Bennett's wife.
The panel also included Sharon Kennedy, who stated that she lived in the same neighborhood as Bennett, that their daughters were in the same class, that Bennett's wife was her daughter's cheerleading coach, and that Bennett's nephew was her son's college roommate. Steven Bender, who was also on the panel, stated that he believed there was too much litigation and that he did not like advertisements for personal injury cases.
Following the questioning of the prospective jurors, Merritt challenged Harp and Carneal for cause based upon their employment relationship with EVSC, as well as Kennedy based on her family's acquaintance with Bennett. The trial court denied all of the challenges. Thereafter, Merritt used peremptory strikes to excuse Carneal, Kennedy, and Bender from the jury panel. Harp was seated on the jury and ultimately became the foreperson.
Analysis
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erroneously denied Merritt's challenges for cause of the two prospective jurors who were employees of EVSC. Merritt contends that Harp and Carneal were "impliedly biased and/or biased as a matter of law because they were employed by the defendant, EVSC." Appellant's Brief p. 7. We agree.
The grant or denial of a challenge to a juror is within the discretion of the trial court. Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 960 (Ind. 1992). On appeal, the trial court's decision will be reversed only if the decision is illogical or arbitrary. See id. A biased juror must be removed. Threats v. State, 582 N.E.2d 396, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). A juror's bias may be actual or implied, which may be presumed from the juror's relationship with one of the parties. Jackson, 597 N.E.2d at 960. Implied bias is bias attributable by law to a prospective juror upon a finding of a certain relationship, regardless of actual partiality. Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Threats, 582 N.E.2d at 398.
Our courts have inferred bias on the part of relatives of persons employed by the prosecutor's office, finding them incompetent to serve. See Haak v. State, 275 Ind. 415, 417 N.E.2d 321 (1981); Barnes v. State, 263 Ind. 320, 330 N.E.2d 743 (1975). We have described this presumption of bias as resting upon the assumption that "a deputy prosecutor, by virtue of his employment, would identify so s
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