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Arredondo v. Avis Rent a Car System3/27/2001
rredondos argue the Continental policy was a "policy of insurance or [part of a] combination of policies [together with the Pathfinder policy] purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301." Id. § 31A-22-302(1). Therefore, the argument continues, the Continental policy must provide "motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22- 304." Id. § 31A-22-302(1)(a). The Arredondos further contend that, to provide "motor vehicle liability coverage under Section 31A-22-303," id., the Continental policy must provide coverage to persons, such as Kai Walston, who are "related to the named insured by blood who are residents of the named insured's household[,] . . . to the same extent as the named insured," id. § 31A-22-303(1)(c), regardless of the policy's own limitations on the scope of its coverage.
To address the Arredondos' argument, we must first determine whether the Continental policy was a "policy of insurance or [part of a] combination of policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301." Id. § 31A-22-302(1). If it was, then we must determine whether it must, therefore, provide coverage to Kai Walston, as a blood relative of the named insured who resided in her household at the time of the accident, "to the same extent as the named insured." Id. § 31A-22-303(1)(c).
"`When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute.'" C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 9, 977 P.2d 479 (quoting Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997)). In so doing, "` e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Id. (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). We will not "`infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and [we have] no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.'" Id. (quoting Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)).
The Arredondos argue that the correct interpretation of section 31A-22-302(1) is that any policy or combination of policies that actually satisfies the statutory security requirement was "purchased to satisfy" the requirement. We disagree. Under the Arredondos' interpretation, the statute would, effectively, be rewritten to govern " very policy of insurance or combination of policies [that satisfies] the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(1). This flies in the face of this court's "`fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute,'" Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1996) (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.11 (Utah 1988)), and distorts the "ordinary and accepted meaning" of the phrase "purchased to satisfy."
Whether a policy or combination of policies was "purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301," Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (emphasis added), hinges not on whether it actually satisfies the statutory security requirement, but rather whether it was purchased for the purpose of satisfying the statutory security requirement. This interpretation better reflects the "ordinary and accepted meaning" of the language used by the legislature.
With this interpretation in mind, we now turn to the policies at issue in this case. On the one hand, it is clear the Pathfinder policy was purchased to satisfy the statutory security requirement. In determining the purpose for which the
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