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S & S Construction5/24/2000
er makes a prima facie showing that he falls within this category, then the employer bears the burden of going forward with evidence that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to that worker. Id. In considering the pertinent factors, a worker's motivation to return to work is also relevant since a lack of interest or a negative attitude impedes assessment of a loss in earning capacity. City of Fayetteville v. Guess, 10 Ark. App. 313, 663 S.W.2d 946 (1984). We hold that the Commission could reasonably conclude that Coplin demonstrated a prima facie case of falling within the odd-lot category and that appellant failed to present proof to rebut that prima facie case.
As to the finding that the Fund has no liability, we likewise affirm. The Fund becomes liable after the following requirements are met:
(1) the employee must have suffered a compensable injury at the present place of employment;
(2) prior to that injury , the employee must have had a permanent partial disability or impairment; and
(3) the disability or impairment must have combined with the recent compensable injury to produce the current disability status.
Second Injury Fund v. Stephens, 62 Ark. App. 255, 970 S.W.2d 331 (1998). The Fund is obligated to provide compensation for any disability greater than the disability resulting from the earlier injury and the anatomical impairment caused by the second injury. Ark. Code Ann. ยง 11-9-525 (Repl. 1996); see also Nelson v. Timberline International, Inc., 332 Ark. 165, 964 S.W.2d 357 (1998). The stated public purpose of the establishment of the Fund is to encourage employment of handicapped or disabled workers by assigning liabilities for the wage-loss consequences of a second injury to the Fund. Id. The Commission found that Coplin's current disability status was solely due to the most recent work-related injury. We cannot say that fair minds could not so conclude. See e.g. PAM, Inc. v. Taylor, 325 Ark. 334, 925 S.W.2d 790 (1996).
The Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and it is affirmed.
Bird and Meads, JJ., agree.
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