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Henderson v. Housing Authority of the City of North Little Rock5/3/2000
d by the supreme court, because it found that the appellant's claims against John Doe No. 1 and John Doe No. 2 were still pending. The court held:
In the case before us today, it is clear that the trial court has not entered a final order as to the two John Doe defendants. Pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a), a plaintiff may file a motion requesting a voluntary dismissal (or non-suit) of a claim or claims against one or all of the defendants. As mentioned above, Ms. Shackelford filed such a motion as to the Pattersons, and the trial court entered an order of dismissal as to the Pattersons only on October 6, 1997. Ms. Shackelford, however, did not file a motion for a voluntary dismissal (or non-suit) as to John Doe 1 and 2. Even if we assume that Ms. Shackelford's second amended and substituted complaint was in the nature of a motion to dismiss her claims against John Doe 1 and 2, there is no order in the record granting such a dismissal against these two defendants. In Blaylock v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 330 Ark. 620, 954 S.W.2d 939 (1997), we recently held that the mere filing of a motion to dismiss is insufficient to conclude the action. Instead, the claim against the defendant remains until the trial court enters an order of dismissal. Id. Stated differently, an order of dismissal (or non-suit) does not become effective until it is entered. Id.; see also Standridge v. Standridge, 298 Ark. 494, 769 S.W.2d 12 (1989). Shackelford v. Arkansas Power & Light, 334 Ark. at 636, 976 S.W.2d 951-52.
The record in the present case does not indicate that any orders have been entered by the circuit court disposing of appellants' claims against the John Doe defendants. Furthermore, no certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) was made by the circuit court that would justify an immediate appeal. Appellants bear the burden of producing a record on appeal that demonstrates that the trial court's order meets the certification requirements of Rule 54(b). See Cortese v. Atlantic Richfield, 320 Ark. 639, 898 S.W.2d 467 (1995). Appellants have not demonstrated that the order from which they appeal is final for appellate purposes.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of finality without prejudice to refile at a later time.
Appeal dismissed.
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