PRICE v. PRICE5/18/2000
This court accepted jurisdiction of the appeal because it presents a significant issue needing clarification or development of the law and also requires our interpretation of an act of the General Assembly. Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 1-2(b)(5), (6) (2000). Specifically, we are asked whether Ark. Code Ann. § 16-65-121 (Supp. 1999) or Ark.R.Civ.P. 58 controls the facts in this case.
The facts are undisputed. Charles and Sue Price were married and had three sons. In 1977, they divorced and remarried; they later filed again for divorce in 1997. The second divorce proceeding is in issue here. On July 23, 1997, the chancellor announced from the bench that Sue Price be awarded the divorce, and at the same proceeding, the parties' stipulated agreement concerning property, debts, fees, and costs, was read into the record and acknowledged by both of them. On August 8, 1997, Charles was killed in a car accident before the parties' divorce decree was entered. In fact, the parties' decree was not filed of record until June 19, 1998. See Price v. Price, 337 Ark. 372, 990 S.W.2d 514 (1999) (per curiam). On August 8, 1998, Sue Price filed a petition
in the Miller County Probate Court, seeking to be appointed administratrix of Charles's estate and asserting she was entitled to the appointment because she was Charles's surviving spouse. The Prices' adult sons contested Sue's appointment, stating she was not married to Charles at the time of his death. They claimed that Sue had been awarded a final divorce on July 23, 1997, and therefore was not Charles's surviving spouse when he was killed on August 8, 1997. The probate judge ruled that, for the purpose of this proceeding, the Prices' divorce was not final and in effect because Charles died before the Prices' decree had been entered. As a consequence, the judge determined the Prices were still married when Charles was killed. Even so, the judge denied Sue's request to be administratrix, and instead appointed one of the sons, Kenneth Price, as administrator. The Prices' sons, Rodney, Kenneth, and Randy ("the sons"), appeal the judge's ruling finding Sue to be Charles's surviving spouse. They further claim that because she is not Charles's surviving spouse, she is not entitled to share in his estate. Sue does not challenge or appeal Kenneth's appointment as administrator.
In their appeal, the sons rely on Act 98, § 1 of 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-65-121 (Supp. 1999), which, in relevant part, provides, "All judgments, orders, and decrees . . . are effective as to all parties of record from the date rendered and not from the date of entry of record." (Emphasis added.) Act 98, § 2 of 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-67-101 (Supp. 1999), provides that the "time for filing a notice of appeal shall commence upon the filing and entry of record of the judgment, order, or decree pursuant to Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure." The sons reason that, under these 1989 statutory provisions, the chancellor's oral pronouncement rendering Sue a divorce on July 23, 1997, was effective on that date.
Sue, on the other hand, relies on Ark.R.Civ.P. 58, which in pertinent part reads as follows: "Every judgment or decree shall be
set forth on a separate document. A judgment or decree is effective only when so set forth and entered as provided in Administrative Order No. 2." (Emphasis added.) Administrative Order No. 2 provides that a judgment, decree, or order is entered when so stamped or marked by the clerk. Sue argues that, under Rule 58 and Administrative Order No. 2, the chancellor's pronouncement awarding her a divorce on July 23, 1997, was not effective on that date, since no separate decree
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