Kaibab Industries v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona5/16/2000
y circumstances that would constitute a new injury, the employer is liable for all disabilities flowing from that aggravation. See Lockhart v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 209, 211, 487 P.2d 430, 432 (1971).
Alternatively, when a change in condition is but an aggravation of the first injury, there is no new injury. Id. at 211, 487 P.2d at 432. For instance, if the claimant's current symptoms are an exacerbation of a prior industrial injury, then it does not represent a new injury. See Siqueiros v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Ariz. App. 104, 108, 510 P.2d 415, 419 (1973). Additionally, if the subsequent incident merely provides the opportunity for a manifestation of the pre-existing condition, it is not compensable. See New Pueblo Constrs. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ariz. 236, 237, 564 P.2d 925, 926 (App. 1977). Thus, in the absence of a new work-related injury, the successive-injury doctrine is not applicable. See Dr. Pepper Co., 154 Ariz at 566-67, 744 P.2d at 478-79.
With respect to the 1997 incident, the ALJ made factual findings, supported by the record, which justify his conclusion that Ms. Sinks did not sustain a new injury in 1997. Dr. Shapiro's testimony itself supports a finding that the 1997 incident exacerbated the 1995 condition. Given that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the award, see In re Estate of Bedwell v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Ariz. 443, 444-45, 454 P.2d 985, 986-87 (1969), the testimony of Dr. Shapiro is sufficient for us to conclude that the successive-injury doctrine does not apply because no new injury occurred in 1997.
2. Out-of-State Claim Does Not Preclude Application of the Successive-injury Doctrine
Although the conclusion that Ms. Sinks did not experience a new injury in 1997 is dispositive, we address Lumbermen's additional arguments because they offer an opportunity to clarify the successive-injury doctrine. Assuming that Ms. Sinks had sustained a new injury, Lumbermen's contends that the ALJ erred when he implied that an out-of-state new injury claim would preclude the application of the successive-injury doctrine.
According to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, "the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced." Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270 (1980), quoting Hampton v. McConnel, 3 U.S. (Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818). Thus, one state must recognize those judgments that have become res judicata in every other state. Id. at 281; see Cofer v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 Ariz. App. 357, 359, 538 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1975).
Unlike a court of general jurisdiction, the Commission has limited power to recognize the interests of another state because its jurisdiction is limited to questions pertaining to the worker's compensation law, applying only its state law. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281-82. It is only after the Commission enters its award that a state has an interest in preserving the integrity of its award. Id. at 283-84.
Contingent upon judicial review, the Industrial Commission of Arizona establishes the full measure of a petitioner's rights according to Arizona law. Once an award is entered, the state has an interest in preserving the integrity of the award, an interest protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See id. Accordingly, other states, such as Utah, must recognize the validity of the decision to reopen the 1995 claim and the award to Ms. Sinks. Thus, the ALJ could apply the successive-injury doctrine to an out-of-state claim once that state enters a final award on the merits.
The caveat to this g
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