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Kaibab Industries v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona5/16/2000
eneral assertion, however, is that the successive-injury doctrine only applies when the several potentially liable parties are present in the proceedings. See Dr. Pepper Co., 154 Ariz at 567, 744 P.2d at 479. Specifically, the successive-injury doctrine requires that the ALJ decide who from among the "'several carriers present in the proceedings must bear the loss.'" Id., quoting Mercante, 153 Ariz. at 266, 735 P.2d at 1389. Therefore, without a responsible employer present in the proceedings, see Pearce Development, 147 Ariz. at 602, 712 P.2d at 449), the Commission cannot give full faith and credit to a foreign claim.
Ms. Sinks did not have a valid new-injury claim in Utah to receive full faith and credit. Moreover, the ALJ could not allocate liability to the new-injury claim in Utah because the Utah employer was not present in the proceedings. Thus, while we disagreewith the ALJ's suggestion that Arizona will not recognize new-injury claims in other jurisdictions, we agree that he had no authority to apply the successive-injury doctrine in this case. There was no valid new-injury claim in Utah, and the Utah employer was not present.
C. Sufficiency of Evidence to Reopen a Claim
Lumbermen's next argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the ALJ to reopen the 1995 claim because the testimony ultimately adopted by the ALJ was factually inaccurate. Essentially, Lumbermen's asks that we re-weigh the evidence. This we cannot do. See Ford, 145 Ariz. at 519, 703 P.2d at 463.
To reopen a claim because of a changed or previously undiscovered condition, the claimant must first demonstrate the existence of the condition and must then show a causal connection between her condition and her previously closed claim. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ยง 23-1061(H); Stainless Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Ariz. 12, 19, 695 P.2d 261, 268 (1985). If the injury is not readily apparent to a layman, the existence of a condition can be established only by expert medical testimony. See Fry's Food Stores v. Industrial Comm'n, 161 Ariz. Ariz. App. at 289, 506 P.2d at 1074. In this regard, Ms. Sinks agrees that Lumbermen's would be entitled to a credit for any worker's compensation benefits awarded in Utah. 119, 121, 776 P.2d 797, 799 (1989).
Lumberman's does not contest the existence of Ms. Sinks' physical condition but the causal connection between her current condition and her 1995 claim.
Generally, a claimant bears the burden of proving a causal connection between her condition and employment. In this context, an expert's medical testimony may become so diminished by proof of an inaccurate factual background that the testimony does not meet the burden of proof necessary to create the causal nexus. See Russell v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 138, 143, 402 P.2d 561, 564 (1965). If the ALJ relies upon an inaccurate factual foundation in issuing the award, the award must be set aside. See Fry's Food Stores, 161 Ariz. at 122, 776 P.2d at 800; see also Desert Insulations, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 134 Ariz. 148, 151, 654 P.2d 296, 299 (App. 1982).
Lumbermen's argues that Dr. Shapiro's testimony regarding the 1995 industrial injury lacked a sufficient foundation because he relied on Ms. Sinks' inaccurate factual history of ongoing calf numbness. It claims that Dr. Shapiro's reliance upon Ms. Sinks' admittedly faded recollection of symptoms, coupled with his failure to review her documented medical history from 1994 and 1995, undermines the factual foundation for his medical opinion. It concludes that the ALJ's decision to reopen the 1995 claim constitutes an abuse of his discretion.
When reasonable evidence exists to suppor
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