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Britton v. Smythe9/21/2000
ation that he and Smythe, Cramer would fully cover plaintiff under the legal defense fund. Plaintiff claims the president's representation to her husband that we always intended to represent Judy in this matter constituted a guarantee of a legal defense.
Promissory estoppel is promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Talley v. Teamsters Local No. 377 (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 142, 146, quoting and adopting Restatement of the Law, Contracts 2d (1973), Section 90. In order to prove a case of promissory estoppel under Ohio law, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reliance that is reasonable and foreseeable; and (4)injury caused by the reliance. Weiper v. W.A. Hill & Assocs. (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 250, 260.
The court did not err by granting summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim because plaintiff cannot hold the president personally responsible for promises he made on behalf of Smythe, Cramer.
"An officer of a corporation is not personally liable on contracts * * * for which his corporate principal is liable, unless he intentionally or inadvertently binds himself as an individual." Centennial Ins. Co. Of New York v. Vic Tanny Internat'l. Of Toledo, Inc. (1975), 46 Ohio App.2d 137, 142.
The evidence fails to show the president's representations were made in an individual capacity, as opposed to his capacity as a corporate officer. Smythe, Cramer administered the legal defense program, not the president. Plaintiff submitted no evidence to show that he directly bound himself by any representations. In fact, the one piece of evidence plaintiff does point to, a letter from the president to her husband, belies her own argument. In that letter, the president wrote to plaintiff's husband, " now that we always intended to represent Judy in this matter." The president's use of the first person plural pronoun "we" does not suggest individual action on his part, but action on behalf of the corporate entity. For this reason, the court did not err by granting summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim. The third assignment of error is overruled.
IV.
The first cross-assignment of error complains the court erred by striking the affidavits of three attorneys who represented Smythe, Cramer and plaintiff in the Lamb litigation. Those affidavits, contained in Smythe, Cramer's motion for reconsideration of the court's initial ruling concerning plaintiff's bad faith claim, generally stated that the Lamb matter could not be settled prior to trial. Plaintiff asked the court to strike the affidavits because they contained client confidences relating to plaintiff's settlement posture, her defense strategy and her unwillingness to meet Lamb's demands. The court struck the affidavits without opinion.
The court did not err by striking the affidavits. An attorney owes a client a duty of vigorous advocacy that a client has a right to expect will continue until the matter is completely resolved. In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation (C.A.3, 1984), 748 F.2d 157, 161. Moreover, an attorney may not abandon his client and take an adverse position in the same case. Id. As a matter of professional responsibility, an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to his client. This duty encompasses an obligation to defer to the client's wishes on major litigation decisions, not to divulge confidential communications from th
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