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Robinson v. Nabisco9/28/2000
is the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition." (Emphasis added.)
First, claimant contended that the CME injury was a new compensable injury and that the injury and her need for treatment arose out of and within the course of employment. ORS 656.005(7)(a). Second, claimant contended that the CME injury was compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).
After a hearing in May 1993, the ALJ upheld employer's partial denial of claimant's injury . The ALJ did not analyze the facts to determine whether claimant's CME injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. The ALJ determined that the CME injury was a new injury that was a "consequence" of claimant's original injury. Accordingly, the ALJ applied the major contributing cause standard that governs the compensability of consequential conditions. See ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) (setting out that standard). The ALJ concluded that claimant's CME injury was not compensable, because the major contributing cause of that injury was Watson's conduct during the CME "or the combination of that injury with some degree of pre-existing degenerative disc disease in the spine," not claimant's original 1981 injury.
On review, the Board adopted the ALJ's order. The Board agreed with the ALJ that claimant had not demonstrated that the 1981 compensable injury was the major contributing cause of the 1992 CME injury. As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed. This court allowed claimant's petition for review.
On review, petitioner contends that her CME injury is compensable under the following test stated by this court in Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc., 323 Or 154, 162, 915 P2d 972 (1996):
"In particular factual circumstances, various tests may prove helpful in measuring and conceptualizing the strength of the connection between the claimant's injury and employment. Still, the ultimate test is the same: Considering all the pertinent circumstances, are the temporal, spatial, circumstantial, and causal connections between the claimant's injury and employment sufficient to justify compensation, when sufficiency is evaluated in the light of the Act's policy of providing financial protection to workers who are injured in the course of employment, regardless of fault? Thus, when confronted with a test that purports to determine whether an injury sustained under a particular set of factual circumstances is compensable, we must ask, 'Is the test compatible with that formulation?'"
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the connection between claimant's 1992 CME injury and her employment is sufficient to justify compensation. In addition, we conclude that the limitation in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), regarding a consequential condition, is inapplicable to this case. It follows from those conclusions that claimant's 1992 CME injury is a compensable injury.
Our task is to determine whether claimant's 1992 CME injury is a "compensable injury" under ORS 656.005(7)(a). Because we must construe the statute, the principles set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), guide our interpretation. We begin by considering the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11. We also consider, at the first level of analysis, prior case law from this court that interprets the same statutory wording, as well as other related statutes. State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532, 964 P2d 1007 (1998).
The text of ORS 656.005(7)(a) describes a series of legal issues that govern the determination whether an accidental injury is compensable
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