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Rubano v. DiCenzo9/25/2000
d that the court therefore should enforce its own order and Rubano's visitation agreement with DiCenzo. Expressing doubts about how these issues should be resolved, the Family Court certified to this Court the three questions set forth below. After reviewing the parties' legal briefs and that of the amici, and after considering their oral arguments, we respond to these questions as follows.
Question I
"Does a child, biological mother, and same sex partner, who have been involved in a committed relationship constitute a 'family relationship' within the meaning of G.L. § 8-10-3, such that the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain a miscellaneous petition for visitation by the former same sex partner when the same sex partner is no longer engaged in the committed relationship?"
The Family Court has asked us to rule on whether it has the power to adjudicate Rubano's petition to determine her de facto parental status and to enforce the parties' visitation agreement under the Family Court's G.L. 1956 § 8-10-3(a) jurisdiction to hear "equitable matters arising out of the family relationship." We begin our analysis by examining the above-referenced statutory language of § 8-10-3 to ascertain whether its provisions are clear and unambiguous, see State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 764 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam); if so, "the statute may not be construed or extended but must be applied literally." Pizza Hut of America, Inc. v. Pastore, 519 A.2d 592, 593 (R.I. 1987) (quoting Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 57 (R.I. 1980)). " he Family Court, as a court of statutory origin, has no more powers than those expressly conferred upon it by the Legislature." Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1220 (R.I. 1985). Thus, it is powerless to act when the subject matter of a dispute is not within its statutory grant of jurisdiction. See Rogers v. Rogers, 98 R.I. 263, 267-68, 201 A.2d 140, 143 (1964).
Section 8-10-3, entitled "Establishment of court -- Jurisdiction * * *," provides in pertinent part, as follows: "(a) There is hereby established a family court * * * to hear and determine * * * equitable matters arising out of the family relationship, wherein jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of petitions for divorce , bed and board and separate maintenance * * *." (Emphasis added.) Asserting that the above-referenced "family relationship" language in § 8-10-3 does not cover the situation presented by the case at bar, DiCenzo urges us to answer question number one in the negative. Rubano, on the other hand, posits a "liberal" interpretation of the "equitable matters arising out of the family relationship" jurisdiction of § 8-10-3, one that would encompass a sufficiently broad authority for the Family Court to take cognizance over disputes like this one. Section 8-10-2, she argues, buttresses her position because it mandates a "liberal" construction of the Family Court's jurisdictional grant of authority in order to realize the purposes of the law establishing the Family Court. Rubano reasons that the language of § 8-10-2 reveals a legislative intent to paint the Family Court's powers with a broad jurisdictional brush so it can protect the best interests of children who need its oversight. This intent, she suggests, calls for an expansive reading of this portion of the Family Court's jurisdictional statute to include the "family relationship" before us.
Upon reviewing the statutory language at issue, however, it is immediately apparent to us that this portion of § 8-10-3 does not grant jurisdiction to the Family Court in all "equitable matters arising out of the family relationship," but only in those equitable matters "wherein jurisdictio
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