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Mills v. Wong9/15/2000
county of their residence." (Emphasis added). Pursuant to this section, Lauderdale County is the only proper venue for the action against the Appellant. Both the Appellees and the Appellant reside in Lauderdale County and the cause of action against the Appellant arose in Lauderdale County.
The cases cited by the Appellee, specifically Commercial Truck and Trailor Sales v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. 1979), Woods v. Fields, 798 S.W.2d 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), and Fred's Finance v. Fred's of Dyersburg, 741 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987), do not present a factual scenario similar to the present case in that none of those cases has a plaintiff, defendant, and cause of action which are confined to one county. The critical point of this fact is that T.C.A. § 20-4-101(b) is not at issue in those cases. Therefore, those courts were not faced with the specific question of whether joinder of a party served to overcome the special venue rule applicable to a purely localized action. Therefore, to the extent the Appellees present those cases as dispositive of the present dispute, we believe that reliance is misplaced.
In Tims v. Carter, 241 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. 1951), our Supreme Court stated:
We ... conclude that where the plaintiff and a material defendant or defendants reside in the same county, this county being the county where the cause of action accrued, that then the county of the residences of those parties should be the county of action for venue purposes. Tims, 241 S.W.2d at 503.
We recognize that the Tims case presents a factual distinction insofar as there was only one cause of action in that case as opposed to the present case in which the causes of action accrued in both Lauderdale County and Shelby County. However, the Tims decision clearly states that when the critical factors converge in one county, that county is the proper venue. We believe the rule espoused in Tims is equally applicable in the present case. The language of Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-4-101(b) is mandatory and has been consistently recognized as such. In his book, Tennessee Circuit Court Practice, Professor Lawrence Pivnick notes that Tennessee courts have adopted several ancillary venue rules. He states:
First, if venue is proper as to one of several defendants who is a material party, venue is proper as to all properly joined defendants, even if venue would not be proper as to the other defendants if sued individually. An exception, however, applies as to a defendant having common county residence with the plaintiff. Lawrence A. Pivnick, Tennessee Circuit Court Practice § 6-2 (1999)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).
In support of the exception, Professor Pivnick cites Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-4-101(b). Professor Pivnick also notes that the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure specifically defer to Tennessee statutes with respect to venue. See Lawrence A. Pivnick, Tennessee Circuit Court Practice § 6-1 (1999)(citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01). If this case were simply the Appellees suing the Appellant, Lauderdale County would be the proper venue pursuant to T.C.A. § 20-4-101(b). We find nothing which would lead us to conclude that the addition of the Shelby County defendants does anything to change that fact. As such, the trial court erred in not granting the Appellants motion to dismiss for improper venue.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the complaint against the Appellant, Luis Wong, is dismissed for improper venue. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Appellees, Frank and Rebecca Mills, for which execution may issue if necessary.
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
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