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Ruttley v. Lee5/17/2000
scene, Ms. Bolotte met her mother who already knew that Stacey had passed away in the accident. Ms. Bolotte went to Stacey's car and saw the blood in it. Ms. Bolotte testified that her mother gets angry more often and does not attend church as much now that Stacey is dead.
Mrs. Ruttley testified that she was a homemaker. She further testified that they were a close family and that Stacey was "my baby." Stacey and her mother watched T.V. together, ate supper together, and talked a great deal.
On the day of the accident, Mrs. Ruttley testified that her niece, Ms. Hawkins, called her to tell her that Stacey had been in a bad accident. When she arrived at the scene, Mrs. Ruttley was informed that her daughter had passed away and she fell to her knees. She further testified that the car was covered with a canvas. Mrs. Ruttley never actually saw her daughter's body being removed because the canvas was over it. The police officers did not permit Mrs. Ruttley to go to the car. She testified that she has trouble sleeping now because she thinks about Stacey, and she is currently taking Zanax as a sleeping aid. Causation
Jefferson Parish argues that the plaintiffs did not prove causation because they did not have a reconstruction expert to reconstruct the accident and explain the reason that Stacey pulled into the intersection. Plaintiffs respond that they carried their burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the sight obstructions at the intersection were a substantial cause of the accident. Plaintiffs also maintain that the Parish of Jefferson failed to properly trim the foliage.
Louisiana law provides two theories under which the Parish of Jefferson may be held liable for damages; negligence, based on LSA-C.C. art. 2315, and strict liability, based on LSA-C.C. art. 2317. Traditionally, these theories could be distinguished because, under strict liability, a plaintiff was relieved of proving that the owner or custodian of a thing which caused damage knew or should have known of the risk involved. Campbell v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Development, 94-1052, (La.1/17/95), 648 So.2d 898, 901; LSA-R.S. 9:2800. LSA- R.S. 9:2800 eviscerates this distinction in claims against public entities, however, by requiring proof of actual or constructive notice of the defect which causes damage. Thus, the burden of proof is now the same under either theory. The plaintiff must establish that the thing which caused the damage was in the custody of the defendant, that the thing was defective because it had a condition which created an unreasonable risk of harm, that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defect and failed to take corrective measures within a reasonable time, and that the defect was a cause in fact of plaintiff's injuries. Bessard v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development., 94-0589 (La.11/30/94), 645 So.2d 1134, 1136; Oster v. Dept. of Transp. and Development., 582 So.2d 1285, 1288 (La.1991).
The Parish of Jefferson has a duty to maintain public roads in a safe condition so as not to expose the public to unreasonable dangers. Holt v. State through Dept of Transp. and Development, 28,183 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/3/96), 671 So.2d 1164, 1170, writ denied, 96-1074 (La. 6/21/96), 675 So.2d 1093. The Parish of Jefferson, while not the insurer of the safety of drivers using state highways, cannot knowingly allow a condition to exist that is hazardous to a reasonably prudent motorist. Id.
Causation is a fact-specific inquiry. Rick v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development, 93-1776 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1271, 1275. Great deference is accorded to the trier of fact on the issue of causation. Id.
In this case, the t
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