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Ruttley v. Lee5/17/2000
marked stop line, but if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right of way to all vehicles which have entered the intersection from another highway or which are approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard.
When a motorist is confronted with a stop sign at an intersection, it is her duty to come to a complete stop, to appraise traffic, and to make certain that the way is clear before proceeding. Coleman v. Rabon, 561 So.2d 897, 900 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 567 So.2d 617, 822 (La.1990); Vallery v. State Through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 480 So.2d 818, 822 (La. App. 3 Cir.1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1350 (La.1986). When a motorist stops her vehicle before entering a right-of-way street, she has performed only half of the duty which the law has imposed upon her. To stop and then proceed in the immediate path of oncoming vehicles constitutes gross negligence. Coleman, 561 So.2d at 900; Vallery, 480 So.2d at 822.
The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Stacey was negligent in failing to stop at a point where she could see the oncoming traffic and entering the intersection when it was not prudent for her to do so. Therefore, we find the trial court's findings of fact are not manifestly erroneous.
COMPARATIVE FAULT
Jefferson Parish argues that the trial court erred in failing to assess more than 20% fault to Stacey. Jefferson Parish further argues that Stacey had a heightened duty not to pull out from the position of safety. Plaintiffs respond that the trial court correctly apportioned the majority of fault to the Parish of Jefferson because the sight obstructions gave Stacey a false sense of safety and prevented her from being seen by Deputy Roddy.
The trier of fact is owed great deference in its allocation of fault and its findings may not be reversed unless clearly wrong. Clement v. Frey, 95-1119, 95-1163 (La. 01/16/96), 666 So.2d 607, 609-610. Like the assessment of damages, fault allocation is a factual determination and the trier of fact, unlike the appellate court, has the benefit of viewing firsthand the witnesses and evidence. Clement, 666 So.2d at 609-610. It is the Court of Appeal's duty to give deference to the trier of fact. An appellate court may reallocate fault only after it has found an abuse of discretion and then only to the extent of lowering or raising the percentage of fault to the highest or lowest point reasonably within the trial court's discretion. Hill v. Morehouse Parish Police Jury, 95-1100 (La. 01/16/96), 666 So.2d 612, 614; Clement, 666 So.2d at 609-610.
The Parish of Jefferson claims that the trial court erred in not assigning a greater percentage of fault to Stacey. When the fault of a motorist and the fault of a governing body responsible for warning motorists against unusually dangerous road hazards combine to produce an accident, comparative negligence is applicable. Brown v. State Through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 572 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La. App. 5 Cir.1990), writ denied, 581 So.2d 710 (La.1991).
The principle of comparative fault is codified in LSA-C.C. art. 2323:
If a person suffers injury , death or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person, the claim for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death or loss.
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