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Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist9/15/2000
ncy exceptions to cover "life and health" it could have easily said so. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201(c)(3) (medical emergency exception to prohibition against post-viability abortions if necessary to preserve the woman's "life or health"). It is well settled that when the words of a statute are plain, clear, and unambiguous, we merely look to the statute's plain language to interpret its meaning. E.g., Schering-Plough v. State Bd. of Equal., 999 S.W.2d 773, 775-76 (Tenn. 1999). In our view, the legislature intended the medical emergency exceptions at issue to protect only the life, as opposed to the health, of the woman.
As written, the medical emergency exceptions fail to pass constitutional muster. They impermissibly impinge upon a woman's fundamental procreational autonomy because they do not contain adequate provisions that will permit immediate abortions necessary to protect a woman's health. For this reason, they also fail to satisfy an undue burden analysis. See Stenberg v. Carhart, U.S. at , 120 S. Ct. at 2613.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we hold that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is a vital part of the right to privacy guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution. That right is inherent in the concept of ordered liberty embodied in the Tennessee Constitution and is similar to other privacy interests that have previously been held to be fundamental. We therefore conclude that this specific privacy interest is fundamental. Therefore, the statutory provisions regulating abortion must be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis. After our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that under the Tennessee Constitution, the statutes at issue, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201(c)(2) (the second trimester hospitalization requirement), § 39-15-202(b), (c) (the informed consent and physician-only counseling requirements), § -202(d)(1) (the mandatory waiting period requirement), and § -202(d)(3) and (g) (the medical emergency exceptions) are unconstitutional because the statutes are not narrowly tailored to further compelling state interests. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment that, facially, the hospitalization requirement, the physician-only counseling requirement, and the waiting period requirement are constitutionally valid. We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the medical emergency exceptions are unconstitutional. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a permanent injunction stating:
Defendants, in their official capacity, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from enforcing any provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201(c)(2),(d) and Tenn. Code Ann. § § 39-15-202(b)(c),(d), and (g).
Costs of appeal will be taxed against the State for which execution may issue if necessary.
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