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Cole v. Chandler5/26/2000
he Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to apply to injury to reputation because such a claim would not be compensable under the Act and, two, even if the exclusivity provision would otherwise apply, it does not apply in this case because Cole's injuries did not occur "in the course of" employment. Under Maine's Workers' Compensation Act, in order for an injury to be compensable, the employee must "1) suffer a personal injury, 2) that arises out of and 3) in the course of employment." Knox v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 542 A.2d 363, 366 (Me. 1988). The exclusivity provision is found in 39-A M.R.S.A. § 104, and provides in pertinent part as follows:
An employer who has secured the payment of compensation . . . is exempt from civil actions, either at common law . . . , involving personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment . . . . These exemptions from liability apply to all employees, supervisors, officers and directors of the employer for any personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment . . . . 39-A M.R.S.A. § 104 (Supp. 1999).
Although this is a case of first impression, we are guided by our developing case law. We have consistently applied a broad and encompassing construction to the exclusivity provision. See Beverage v. Cumberland Farms Northern, Inc., 502 A.2d 486, 489 (Me. 1985); Li v. C.N. Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606, 607 (Me. 1994). In Beverage we stated the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act as follows: "The 'legislative intendment in enacting the comprehensive scheme for worker's compensation' was to 'giv effect to the underlying policy of providing certainty of remedy to the injured employee and absolute but limited and determinate liability for the employer.'" Id. at 489 (citation omitted). We further noted that " f few occasions remain for employees to bring civil actions in tort against employers, such is merely the inevitable consequence of the legislature's extension of the coverage of workers' compensation." Id.
We have refused to carve out an exception for intentional torts. See Li v. C.N. Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606 (Me. 1994). In Li the employee of defendant was killed when a former employee robbed the store and stabbed the employee; the employer allegedly knew of the intended armed robbery but did not close the store where the employee was working alone. See id. at 607. The plaintiff argued that the exclusivity and immunity provisions should not apply to injuries to employees caused by intentional torts. We found, however, that the Act applied "to all work-related injuries and deaths, however caused, not just accidental injuries and deaths." Id. at 608. We "decline to create a judicial exception to the exclusivity and immunity provisions for employers' intentional torts," noting that if the Legislature intended to exclude intentional acts, it could have created the exception. Id.
We also have not required that the excluded claims be compensable. See Knox v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 542 A.2d 363 (Me. 1988). In Knox, the plaintiff brought a civil action alleging assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision of her supervisor by the employer. She sought compensatory and punitive damages, including mental injuries, caused by sexual assaults and harassments committed upon her by her supervisor. See id. at 364. We determined that, because injuries arising from assaults have been held compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, no reason exists to distinguish between sexual assaults and non-sexual assaults for purposes of coverage under the Act. See id. at 365. We noted that under the right set of facts, menta
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