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Cole v. Chandler5/26/2000
l or physical injuries from sexual assault could be compensable injuries under the Act. See id. We also noted that " ikewise, injuries resulting from acts of sexual harassment are not excluded from the Act's coverage solely because of the sexual nature of the harassment." Id. at 365-66.
We do not rely on labels or the formal designation of a tort action to determine whether a claim is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Rather, we look to the gist of the action and the nature of the damages sought to determine whether the claim for injury is excluded. See 6 Arthur Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, ยง 104.05 , at 18 (1999). The coverage and exclusivity provisions begin with a focus on personal injuries. Cole's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress seeks a recovery only for mental injuries. As we have held in the past, mental injuries constitute personal injuries within the meaning of the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act and thus an independent claim is barred. See Knox v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 542 A.2d 363 (Me. 1988). Cole's claims for defamation, invasion of privacy and interference with advantageous economic relations, however, are broad enough to include recovery for economic injuries, as well as mental or physical injuries. As with the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, any mental or physical injuries included within these claims are personal injuries and thus recovery is barred by the exclusivity provision. On the other hand, the economic or reputational injuries, if any, do not constitute personal injuries, as they are not physical or mental injuries. Therefore, the recovery of such damages is not precluded by the exclusivity provision.
Concerning those claims that constitute personal injuries under the Act, Cole argues that, even if the exclusivity provision applies in general, it would not apply in this case because the injuries did not occur "in the course of" employment. The purpose the coverage formula seeks to effectuate is "'to compensate employees for injuries suffered while and because they were at work.'" Comeau v. Maine Coastal Servs., 449 A.2d 362, 366 (Me. 1982) (citations omitted). The determination turns on an issue of fact. See Knox v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 542 A.2d 363, 366 (Me. 1988). The question is whether the injury "'occurs within the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.'" Hebert v. International Paper Co., 638 A.2d 1161, 1162 (Me. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Comeau v. Maine Coastal Servs., 449 A.2d 362, 367 (Me. 1982).
Cole argues that his injuries occurred at the time he was terminated while he was at home and compares himself to the defendant in Hebert. In Hebert, however, the plaintiff had been home for a month as a result of falling down stairs at the plant when his brother brought to his house a sign that allegedly had been posted at the mill questioning the sincerity of his fall and resultant back injury . See id. at 1161-62. It was the posting of the sign that caused him the emotional distress and not the injury at work. Therefore, we found that because he was at home at the time, it did not occur "in the course of" employment. See id. at 1162-63.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Cole, however, reveals that in this case the allegedly defamatory statements were made by Chandler and Buckley during the preliminary investigation of Cole for inappropriate behavior in the workplace while Cole was employed at Mead and while he was in his offi
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