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In re Marriage of Pospisil5/23/2000
ey judgment of $305,855, based on what the court found was a net marital estate of $651,916. Similar to the parties in Wagner, from that day forward, they each went their separate ways.
Thus, as a matter of law, Joyce is not entitled to either appreciation or, conversely, any liability that may have accrued on the property exclusively awarded to George, or arising due to his use thereof subsequent to the court's 1996 dissolution decree. Joyce, however, is substantively correct that her 1996 decree judgment of $305,855 should appreciate--namely, this sum should accrue judgment interest.
The District Court indicates in its 1999 order that Joyce "should not be entitled to judgment interest" accruing prior to its order because the maintenance award accounts for what Joyce "would have earned had she had the funds available to invest or had the Court previously reduced her interests to a fixed amount and awarded judgment interest." This assessment is incorrect as a matter of law. Judgment interest is not "awarded." Rather, judgment interest is a statutory right. Under § 25-9-205, MCA, interest is payable on all judgments recovered at the annual rate of ten percent. Under Rule 54(a), M.R.Civ.P., a "judgment" expressly includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. Once a person is liable for a money judgment resulting from a property settlement and payment is not made, the person entitled to the settlement is further entitled to the statutory rate of interest. See in re Marriage of Gibson (1983), 206 Mont. 460, 466, 671 P.2d 629, 632-33; Knudson v. Knudson (1981), 191 Mont. 204, 208-209, 622 P.2d 1025, 1027. Further, under Rule 31, M.R.App.P., " f a judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the district court, the mandate shall contain instructions with respect to allowance of interest."
On this issue, George directs our attention to the rule that interest is not allowable until the exact amount due is ascertained or is ascertainable. See In re Marriage of Gerhart (1990), 245 Mont. 279, 284, 800 P.2d 698, 701. Clearly, the court in its 1996 decree ascertained an exact amount due that was calculated down to the penny. The only uncertainty that remained was whether the $305,855.09 due Joyce would be discharged through a resolution between the parties, or by public sale. In the event of sale, the court reserved some discretion as to interest owed Ruby that may have affected the judgment amount. Again, this event did not occur and, as further discussion below indicates, is no longer material to the resolution of this matter.
We therefore hold that upon remand, the statutory interest rate of ten percent shall be applied to the resulting balance of Joyce's decree, which began accruing in June of 1996, according to the foregoing discussion. We affirm, however, that no interest accrued during the pendency of this appeal, pursuant to the court's order staying execution issued on March 10, 1999. See generally § 27-1-211, MCA (stating that the right to judgment interest excludes period in which debtor is prevented by law or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt).
We further hold that the District Court's determination that George owes Joyce $19,500 in unpaid maintenance plus interest is accordingly subject to the same rules. Thus, each unpaid monthly maintenance payment has continued to accrue ten-percent interest from the time it was due, until the March 10, 1999 stay of execution, and therefore the court's determination that $20,687 is owed in back maintenance and interest must be recalculated consistent with the foregoing.
C. Interest Owed to Ruby Pospisil
Under the f
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