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Ex parte Usrey6/22/2000 In her affidavit, she never said that she told Wal-mart that mistreatment was the reason she was quitting. In fact, she admits that she quit work voluntarily. Lumpkin gave her opinion as to why she quit work with Wal-Mart. Her testimony is irrelevant for determining whether Wal-Mart's termination of Usrey was improper. These statements by Usrey and Lumpkin are little more than unsupported allegations; they are not sufficient evidence to "prove" that Wal-Mart's stated reason was not the true reason, the requirement in such a case as this. See Culbreth, supra, at 1122.
Because of decisions such as this one issued today, employers in the situation Wal-Mart was in face a catch-22 when dealing with an employee who files a workers' compensation claim -- to terminate and face the costs of defending a retaliatory-discharge claim under § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975, or not to terminate, and face a possible sexual-harassment action by the complaining employee for millions of dollars. Those joining the main opinion, in a haste to ensure that this case goes before a jury, ignore certain facts presented to the trial court and mischaracterize the burden of proof applicable in retaliatory-discharge actions like this one. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
MADDOX, JUSTICE (dissenting).
An employee carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge by presenting substantial evidence indicating that his or her employment was terminated solely because he or she filed a workers' compensation action against the employer. See § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975. I do not believe the employee carried this burden; I conclude that the trial judge properly entered the summary judgment for the employer.
See, J., concurs.
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