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Second Injury Fund v. Spence6/21/2000
isability status, the Second Injury Fund has no liability. Id. In the present case, there was evidence that Ms. Spence returned to her rather strenuous work with UPS following her 1987 back surgery and worked without difficulty or restrictions until her compensable back injury in 1994.
Appellant's argument is premised on the assertion that, as a matter of law, a condition cannot constitute a prior disability or impairment unless it affects the employee's ability to work prior to his or her work-related injury . However, in Hawkins Construction Co. v. Maxell, 325 Ark. 133, 924 S.W.2d 789 (1996), the supreme court said that:
The fact that Mr. Maxell suffered no wage-loss disability after [his first injury ] has no necessary bearing on the issue whether he suffered an impairment from that injury which contributes to his present disability.
In short, an employee's ability to return to the same work following a prior injury is simply not determinative of the Second Injury Fund's liability. POM, Inc. v. Taylor, 325 Ark. 334, 925 S.W.2d 790 (1996). Although Ms. Spence was not disabled prior to her 1994 injury, there is substantial evidence to show that her back was nevertheless structurally impaired, and that her present status resulted from a combination of her prior impairment and her compensable injury. Furthermore, because the 1994 injury involved no structural disc damage, we think that the Commission could properly conclude that Ms. Spence's disability would have been less severe had her back not been structurally impaired as a result of her 1987 back injury and surgery. Appellant's argument is therefore without merit.
Finally, appellant contends that Dr. Wilson's testimony that the employee's prior disc injury predisposed her to a second disc injury is not substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding of Second Injury Fund liability. We disagree. Dr. Wilson testified that the employee's condition is complicated by the prior injury and surgery, and we think that reasonable minds could find that the two injuries combined to produce the employee's present condition.
Affirmed.
Neal and Hart, JJ., agree.
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