Ibarra v. Equipment Control5/8/2000
On the instant appeal, we must determine whether the 1996 amendment to §11 of the Workers' Compensation Law, which became effective on September 10, 1996, is applicable to the common-law contribution and indemnification claims asserted against Atlantic Waste Disposal, Inc. (hereinafter Atlantic), and involving work-related injuries suffered by an employee of Atlantic prior to the effective date of the amendment. If applicable, we must also determine whether pursuant to that statute, as amended, which restricts common-law contribution and indemnity claims against employers to cases involving "grave" injuries, Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment dismissing those claims.
On July 5, 1996, the plaintiff Roman Ibarra (hereinafter the plaintiff), an employee of Atlantic, was injured, during the course of his employment, by a bailing machine manufactured by Equipment Control, Inc. (hereinafter Equipment). As a result, the plaintiff interposed a Workers' Compensation claim. On March 3, 1997, the plaintiff commenced this action asserting negligence, strict product liability, and breach of warranty claims against Equipment. Thereafter, on April 25, 1997, Equipment commenced a third-party action against Atlantic and Empire State Recycling Corporation (hereinafter Empire), the distributor of the bailing machine, for common-law contribution and indemnification. In turn, Empire asserted a cross claim for contribution and indemnification against Atlantic. However, as an affirmative defense, Atlantic asserted that, pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law §11, as amended, it could not be held liable for contribution or indemnification.
In moving for summary judgment, Atlantic also argued that pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law §11, as amended, which it claimed was applicable to this case where both the main action and the third-party action were commenced after its effective date, it could not be held to answer for contribution or indemnification. Specifically, it argued that the amended statute now restricted its liability for common-law contribution and indemnification to cases involving a "grave injury", as that term is narrowly defined in the statute. In support of its contention that the plaintiff did not suffer a "grave injury", Atlantic attached to its motion the plaintiff's bill of particulars.
In opposing Atlantic's motion, however, Equipment and Empire maintained that Workers' Compensation Law §11, as amended, was not applicable here since the plaintiff's accident predated its effective date. Moreover, they argued that even if the amended statute were applicable, Atlantic was not entitled to summary judgment inasmuch as there were triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff's injuries were "grave".
The Supreme Court denied Atlantic's motion for summary judgment without reaching the question of whether Workers' Compensation Law §11, as amended, was applicable. In short, it concluded that since the plaintiff had indeed suffered a "grave" injury, Atlantic remained liable for contribution even if Workers' Compensation Law §11, as amended, applied. We reverse.
Section 2 of the Omnibus Workers' Compensation Reform Act (hereinafter the Act), enacted on September 10, 1996, amended Workers' Compensation Law §11 (see, L 1996, ch 635, §2) by restricting third-party contribution claims against employers. Prior to the amendment, pursuant to Dole v Dow Chem. Co. (30 NY2d 143), those claims were permitted even though direct actions against employers were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law (see, Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577; see also, Kline v E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 15 F Supp 2d 29
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