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Andress v. City of Chandler6/13/2000
AFFIRMED
Suzanne and Robert Andress sued a public entity and a public employee for negligence. Because their damages were less than $50,000, the matter was subject to arbitration. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ("A.R.S.") § 12-133 (Supp. 1999); Local R. of Practice for the Super. Cts. (Maricopa County) 3.10(a). The Andresses did not file a notice of claim under A.R.S. section 12-821.01(A) (Supp. 1999) until after the completion of the arbitration proceedings. The question we must answer in this appeal is whether, under A.R.S. section 12-821.01(C), the arbitration statute extended the time in which to file a notice of claim. We hold that it did not, and we therefore affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on this issue.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 10, 1997, Suzanne Andress was injured when her vehicle collided with a City of Chandler street sweeper being driven by Donald Clark. Suzanne and her husband, Robert, sued both the City of Chandler and Clark seeking personal injury and property damages. The Andresses did not file a notice of claim with the City or Clark before filing their lawsuit.
The parties agreed that the case was subject to arbitration under A.R.S. section 12-133. After the case was assigned to an arbitrator, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Andresses had failed to timely serve them with a notice of claim as required by A.R.S. section 12-821.01(A). The Andresses opposed this motion, arguing that under A.R.S. section 12-821.01(C), their notice of claim was not due until after they received a final decision from the arbitrator. The arbitrator denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and ultimately entered an award in favor of the Andresses.
The defendants appealed the arbitration award to the superior court. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the notice of claim issue. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Andresses have appealed.
DISCUSSION
We review a grant of summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. See Estate of Hernandez v. Flavio, 187 Ariz. 506, 509, 930 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1997). Because this case presents no disputes regarding the relevant facts, we address only issues of statutory interpretation, which are questions of law subject to de novo review. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Bruining, 186 Ariz. 224, 226, 921 P.2d 24, 26 (1996).
In pertinent part, A.R.S. section 12-821.01(A) requires " ersons who have claims against a public entity or a public employee" to file a notice of claim "with the person or persons authorized to accept service . . . within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues." Any claim not filed within 180 days of the accrual date is barred. See id.
The Andresses' claim accrued on September 10, 1997. On that date, Mrs. Andress knew that she was injured, that her car was damaged, and that Clark's alleged negligent operation of the City's street sweeper was the cause of her damages. See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B) (stating that "a cause of action accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage"). But the Andresses did not serve the defendants with a notice of claim until May 6, 1998, more than 180 days after their cause of action accrued. As a result, the trial court concluded that their claim was time-barred.
The Andresses do not dispute that their cause of action accrued on the date of the accident. However, they assert that A.R.S.
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