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Dycoco v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital5/15/2000
THAT THESE APPELLEES WERE NOT LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF APPELLANT'S DECEDENT, ANTOLIN M. DYCOCO, M.D. BY DEFAMING HIM.
IV THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL & REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED ALL DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH HELD THAT THESE APPELLEES DID NOT INTENTIONALLY INFLICT EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UPON APPELLANT'S DECEDENT, ANTOLIN M. DYCOCO, M.D.
V THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL & REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED ALL DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH HELD THAT THESE APPELLEES WHERE NOT LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF APPELLANT'S DECEDENT, ANTOLIN M. DYCOCO, M.D.
VI THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL & REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED ALL DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH HELD THAT THESE APPELLEES WHERE NOT LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR THE FUNERAL EXPENSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM OF APPELLANT'S DECEDENT, ANTOLIN M. DYCOCO, M.D.
VII THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL & REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S, BRADY B. STONER, M.D., MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW WITHOUT FIRST ALLOWING APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ADEQUATE DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO OHIO CIV. R. 56(F).
All of appellant's assignments of error challenge the trial court's granting of summary judgment to appellees. Summary judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of Civ.R. 56. Said rule was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 448: Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274.
As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we must stand in the shoes of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same standard and evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35.
I.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in determining appellees CompHealth, Cambridge and Kron did not breach the agreement between the parties. We disagree. Appellant argues Dr. Dycoco was entitled to due process regarding his termination based upon the March 26, 1993 cover letter sent from appellee Lowenhagen to Dr. Dycoco with the agreement: In regards to your independent contractor agreement, I would like to reinforce that both the Hospital and Cambridge Anesthesiology Associates anticipate that you will continue to be a satisfied and productive member of the anesthesiology department until you choose to leave the Hospital. While the contract specifies the conditions under which you would be required to resign from the Medical Staff, I would like to amplify those circumstances here for your comfort. They are as follows: *(vi) it was felt that you did not demonstrate an acceptable level of clinical competency. In the latter case, we would afford you due process as outlined in the Bylaws of the Medical Staff of Guernsey Memorial Hospital. (Emphasis added.)
See, Appellant's Brief at Exhibit 3A. Appellant challe
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