 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Dycoco v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital5/15/2000
nges the following finding by the trial court in its January 27, 1999 judgment entry: Plaintiff 'cannot now argue that Dr. Dycoco was misled by the Letter or the statements of Lowenhagen or that the doctor intended to be afforded due process rights "when he could have known the truth by merely looking when he signed." This Court cannot conclude that the parties intended any terms other than those expressed in the Agreement.' Dycoco 96 CA 34 supra at 9. The agreement was executed between the parties on March 29, 1993 and included the following integration clause: 16. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding and agreement between the parties and may not be modified except by a written agreement signed by the parties. See, Appellant's Brief at Exhibit 4.
The agreement included the conditions under which Dr. Dycoco "would be required to resign," including the condition cited supra, clinical competency.
Conspicuously absent from the agreement is any guarantee of "due process" afforded under the Bylaws of the Medical Staff of Guernsey Memorial Hospital.
As we previously noted in Dycoco I, the parol evidence rule precludes the introduction of evidence outside the four corners of a written document:
Where the parties, following negotiations, make mutual promises which thereafter are integrated into an unambiguous written contract, duly signed by them, courts will give effect to the parties' expressed intentions. *Intentions not expressed in the writing are deemed to have no existence and may not be shown by parol evidence. Aultman Hosp. Assn. v. Community Mut. Ins. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 51, 53.
In Dycoco I at 7, we found " he language of the Agreement clearly and unambiguously states that a Physician's termination is not subject to a due process hearing or review by Guernsey, its Medical Staff, or its Board of Trustees. Therefore, appellant cannot introduce parol evidence to establish a breach of the contract." Appellant argues appellee Lowenhagen was the agent for Hospital, appellee CompHealth and appellee Cambridge and therefore, once appellee Lowenhagen promised due process via his cover letter, he bound appellees CompHealth and Cambridge to such. Appellant points out there was an ambiguity in the agreement otherwise appellee Lowenhagen would not have had to "amplify" the agreement via the cover letter. Upon review, we once again find the integration clause within the agreement and the parol evidence rule preclude the cover letter statement from being a part of the agreement. Based upon our finding of "no ambiguity" in the agreement, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees on the breach of contract claim. Assignment of Error I is denied.
II.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in determining there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding appellant's claim for tortious interference with a business relationship. We disagree. In order to establish a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship, a party must show the following: From these two cases, we derive the elements of the tort: (1) a business relationship or contract; (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge of the relationship or contract; (3) the wrongdoer's intentional and improper action taken to prevent a contract formation, procure a contractual breach, or terminate a business relationship; (4) a lack of privilege; and (5) resulting damages. Brookside Ambulance, Inc. d.b.a. Rumpf Ambulance Service v. Walker Ambulance Service (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 150, 155-156, citing Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 415, and A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Ohio Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|