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Dycoco v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital5/15/2000
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 1. In its judgment entry of January 27, 1999, the trial court found the following on the issue of tortious interference: The Court finds that Defendants had a contractual right pursuant to their Agreement to 'interfere' with Dr. Dycoco's business relationship with Guernsey Memorial Hospital as Cambridge Anesthesiology Associates was 'engaged by CompHealth to provide professional staffing for the Anesthesiology Department at Guernsey Memorial Hospital.' See Independent Contractor Agreement. The Court concludes that Defendants were privileged *.
Appellant attempts to establish a business relationship between Dr. Dycoco and Hospital by claiming the agreement between appellee CompHealth and Hospital, whereby appellee CompHealth was to manage Hospital's anesthesiology department, created the necessity for Dr. Dycoco and appellee Cambridge to enter into the independent contractor agreement. Without the agreement, Dr. Dycoco would not have been able to perform anesthesiology services at Hospital. Because appellee Cambridge had to hire individuals to perform anesthesiology services at Hospital, those individuals so hired had a business relationship with Hospital. See, Appellant's September 23, 1998 Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellees' act of terminating Dr. Dycoco's agreement resulted in Dr. Dycoco's staff privileges with Hospital being terminated, thereby interfering with the Dycoco/Hospital relationship. We disagree that Dr. Dycoco had a business relationship with Hospital. The independent contractor agreement was between Dr. Dycoco and appellee Cambridge. In terminating said agreement, appellees ended their business relationship with Dr. Dycoco and no longer permitted Dr. Dycoco to perform anesthesiology services at Hospital on behalf of appellee Cambridge.
Dr. Dycoco's right to perform anesthesiology services at Hospital was limited and controlled by his agreement with appellee Cambridge and was subordinate to that agreement. Because Dr. Dycoco never had a contractual/business relationship with Hospital, the claim for tortious interference with a business relationship under Brookside must fail. Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees on the tortious interference with a business relationship claim. Assignment of Error II is denied.
III.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in determining appellees were not liable for the wrongful death of Dr. Dycoco by way of defamation. We disagree. Appellant agrees any potential claims for defamation abated upon Dr. Dycoco's death. However, appellant argues the wrongful death statute, R.C. 2125.01(A)(1), creates a new cause of action separate and apart from the cause of action for defamation: (A)(1) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, if the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default that would have entitled the injured person to maintain a civil action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued or the administrator or executor of the estate of the liable person as that administrator or executor is liable in damages in an action for wrongful death under this chapter *. The specific statutory language governing abatement by death of party, R.C. 2311.21, states as follows: Unless otherwise provided, no action or proceeding pending in any court shall abate by the death of either or both of the parties thereto, except actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, for a nuisance, or against a judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which shall abate by the death of either party.
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