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Porter v. Litigation Management5/11/2000
JUDGMENT: REVERSED, VACATED, REMANDED
Plaintiff-appellant Dorothy Porter ( appellant ) appeals from the orders of the trial court denying Porter's motion for a protective order and, instead, granting defendant-appellee Litigation Management, Inc.'s motion to compel. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On or about January 6, 1997, Porter commenced an employment relationship with Litigation Management, Inc. ( LMI ). On February 19, 1997, LMI terminated Porter.
On December 18, 1997, Porter filed a complaint against LMI and four John and Jane Doe defendants in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In her complaint, appellant averred the following seven counts: breach of contract, breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation.
On March 5, 1998, LMI filed a motion to dismiss Porter's complaint. In a journal entry filed on June 10, 1998, the trial court dismissed Porter's claims of negligent misrepresentation and defamation. On October 11, 1998, Porter voluntarily dismissed her claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress. Discovery continued on Porter's remaining claims, viz., breach of contract, breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel and fraud.
On February 2, 1999, LMI filed a motion to compel. In its supporting brief, LMI requested a court order compelling Porter to answer discovery related to her physical and mental state during her employment. In support of its motion, LMI stated in part:
* * * Defendant contends that Plaintiff was terminated for her irrational and inflammatory behavior toward co-workers, and her inability to deal with the numerous responsibilities of her higher paying executive position.
Testimony given in Plaintiff's deposition revealed that Plaintiff may have had a physical or mental condition that would explain her behavior and inability to perform.
In particular, Porter acknowledged that she was taking Ritalin during her deposition on December 3, 1998.
On February 12, 1999, Porter filed a motion for protective order. In journal entries filed on February 19, 1999, the trial court granted LMI's motion to compel and denied Porter's motion for protective order. Therefrom, Porter filed a timely notice of appeal with this court.
I. TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL (AND OVERRULED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER) THEREBY ALLOWING DEFENDANT UNLIMITED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICALINFORMATION WHERE PLAINTIFF DID NOT MAKE HER CONDITION AN ISSUE BY MAKING CLAIMS FOR PHYSICAL OR MENTAL INJURIES.
II. TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER SINCE IT DID SO WITHOUT LIMITATION WHEN DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS ARE ADDITIONALLY OBJECTIONABLE AS THEY ARE VASTLY OVERBROAD AND WERE NOT MADE SUBJECT TO A CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.
In her first and second assignments of error, Porter argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted LMI's motion to compel and denied Porter's motion for a protective order.
Generally, the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the discovery process. See, e.g., BFI Waste Systems of Ohio v. Garfield Hts. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 62, 75, citing Stegawski v. Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc. (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 78, 85; State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 55. Howeve
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